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MUSLIMS AND THE MYTHS IN THE IMMIGRATION POLITICS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
SOHAIL WAHEDI* 
Today, the explicit use of anti-immigration rhetoric has become 
common among a significant portion of the American political 
establishment. The 2016 election of President Trump generated a 
tougher attitude toward immigration and immigrants.  Subsequently, 
the 2018 midterm elections revealed an increase in “Islamophobic” 
rhetoric among political campaigners. This article focuses on the 
challenges faced by one group—the Muslim community. Specifically, 
this article aims to shed light on the ways in which the contemporary 
anti-immigration atmosphere has targeted American Muslims. In doing 
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so, this article analyzes recent public decisions that have both burdened 
the Muslim community and negatively affected immigrant civil liberties. 
Drawing on these recent decisions, the article proposes a strategy to 
overcome this contemporary era of fear, anxiety, and intolerance 
toward newcomers—specifically those with an Islamic background. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The American Dream of “a land in which life should be better and 
richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to 
his ability or achievement,”1 is a fruitful source of inspiration for many 
                                                          
1. JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 404 (1931). See also 
Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 
417, 427 (2008) (quoting Adams and arguing that the classic work-hard-play-hard 
conception of the American Dream with the aim of achieving a higher level of welfare 
has made room for a thicker conception. Korff notes the modern version of the 
American Dream includes other themes relevant to human flourishing, including 
education, employment opportunities, healthcare, a reliable retirement system, and “a 
general sense of social mobility.”).  
2
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American societal groups in the fight for equality.2  The American 
Dream of a better life for everyone, everywhere in the United States, is 
endorsed by the Declaration of Independence, which states clearly that 
“all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.”3  This powerful and timeless promise of equality 
and welfare inspired great advocates of civil rights and civil liberties, 
such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In what he revealed as “a dream 
deeply rooted in the American dream,” Dr. King scrutinized the 
presence of obvious inequalities in American society and urged the 
nation to stop racial discrimination.4  He dreamed of a land where 
                                                          
2. Although a shift has taken place in the way people have defined the American 
Dream throughout history, today, the bottom line is an egalitarian approach: equal 
opportunities for all citizens, regardless of their racial or economic background. See, 
e.g., Andrea J. Boyack, A New American Dream for Detroit, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 573, 574 (2016) (noting the American Dream “has always been one of equal 
opportunity,” but arguing “there can be no equality of opportunity where there is such 
a stark inequality” in Detroit’s neighborhood decline); Katherine M. Vail, Saving the 
American Dream: The Legalization of the Tiny House Movement, 54 U. LOUISVILLE 
L. REV. 357, 379 (2016) (arguing that the American Dream rests on an idea of creating 
equal opportunities for all); Paul D. Carrington, Financing the American Dream: 
Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1227 (1973) (claiming “the 
right to equal educational opportunity is the American Dream incarnate as 
constitutional law.”). For an official endorsement of this egalitarian conception of the 
American Dream, see George Bush, Exporting the American Dream, 17 HUM. RTS. 
18, 19 (1990) (defending the export of the “American Dream” to new democracies 
and arguing that equality is the most important principle in law that should be 
guaranteed and protected strongly. That is a democracy “that supports a strict equality 
of rights: one that guarantees all men and women—whatever their race or ancestry—
stand equal before the law.”).  
3. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also JIM 
CULLEN, THE AMERICAN DREAM 38 (2003) (arguing that the second paragraph of the 
Declaration of Independence is the “key” to this important document as it 
“underwrites” the American Dream); Darrell A. H. Miller, Continuity and the 
Declaration of Independence, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 601, 605 (2016) (critically analyzing 
the language used in the Declaration and explaining why so many judges, politicians, 
and civil rights activists have drawn on this document to develop their arguments).  
4. Martin Luther King, Jr., “I have a Dream . . .”  Speech at the “March on 
Washington” (Aug. 28, 1963) (transcript available at 
https://www.archives.gov/files/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf) (referring to the 
Declaration of Independence’s promise of equality and criticizing the lack of 
opportunities for non-white people to flourish in life due to the obvious presence of 
racial discrimination).   
3
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people would “not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content 
of their character.”5  He dreamed of true fulfillment of the promise “that 
all men are created equal.”6  With his renowned “I Have a Dream” 
speech, Dr. King created awareness of parallel societies in the United 
States where people did not live together, but rather were separated 
from one another. He warned against the devastating effects of 
segregation, discrimination, and hatred.7  Dr. King described a 
nightmare in which many people lived at that time, and declared his 
unambiguous ambition to end this nightmare for those who faced hatred 
and discrimination instead of opportunities and freedoms.8 
The resounding message behind Dr. King’s speech was that the 
American Dream was a far destination for many American citizens to 
reach.9  His concerns about the inaccessibility of the American Dream 
have urged politicians and legal scholars to consider concrete steps to 
preserve this ideal.10 
Recent history reminds us that institutional support of inequality 
reinforces the emergence of parallel societies.  Within these divisions, 
                                                          
5. Id.  
6. Id.  
7. Id.; see also Katharine Klebes, The Limited Provision of Mental Health 
Services at Community Colleges: Obstacles, Initiatives, and Opportunities for 
Change, 19 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 315, 322 (2017) (referring to a recent study 
demonstrating how racism hinders the true social integration of students with 
immigrant backgrounds on university campuses).  
8. Cf. Kevin Brown, Hopwood: Was this the African-American Nightmare or 
the African-American Dream?, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 97, 102 (1996) (providing 
an overview of cases that have challenged the legality of segregation and defending a 
skeptical approach about eliminating racial discrimination in the future); Kevin 
Brown, End of the Racial Age: Reflections on the Changing Racial and Ethnic 
Ancestry of Blacks on Affirmative Action, 22 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 139, 139 (2017) 
(noting “[m]any minority students experience the environment of their law school as 
hostile.”). 
9. Cf. Monroe H. Little, Jr., More than a Dreamer: Remembering Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., 41 IND. L. REV. 523, 529 (2008) (highlighting the achievements of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. to argue that Dr. King was more than the main voice of civil 
rights protests).  
10. David B. Oppenheimer, Dr. King’s Dream of Affirmative Action, 21 HARV. 
LATINX L. REV. 55, 86 (2018) (arguing Dr. King’s work is still valuable to fight 
inequalities related to race and class). See generally Trina Jones, Occupying America: 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the American Dream, and the Challenge of Socio-
Economic Inequality, 57 VILL. L. REV. 339, 342 (2012). 
4
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only a few people can benefit from opportunities to flourish, while 
others suffer from stagnation and deprivation of basic liberties.11  
Therefore, the idea that all people should have equal opportunities to 
realize the American Dream is often echoed in initiatives propagated by 
legal scholars, or enacted by law after extensive political debates.12  
However, despite the many initiatives geared toward creating equal 
opportunities, the American Dream is still difficult to realize for many 
groups in American society.13  Even the historic victory of Barack 
Obama in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, and the recent 
elections of two Muslim women with immigrant backgrounds to 
Congress, do not erase the palpable presence of racial discrimination in 
the United States.14 
Studies have reaffirmed the presence of ethnic and racial 
discrimination in aspects of life considered crucial for the realization of 
                                                          
11. E.g., Khaled A. Beydoun, Why Ferguson Is Our Issue: A Letter to Muslim 
America, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 (2015). 
12. These steps are mainly in the fields of housing, health care, education, 
employment, and political freedoms and are meant to provide all people—regardless 
of their race, color, class, religion, origin, or sexual orientation—access to the basic 
needs that enable them to flourish in American society. However, the changes in these 
areas should not be overstated. See Damon J. Keith, What Happens to a Dream 
Deferred: An Assessment of Civil Rights Law Twenty Years after the 1963 March on 
Washington, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 469, 469 (1984) (expressing that the 
struggle for equality is not over, rather “the gains made in the legal arena over the 
past . . . decades form only a skeletal foundation for the monumental changes that 
must take place.”).  
13. See generally Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
151 (2016) (criticizing the lack of equal protection in the case law of the Supreme 
Court).  
14. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., What the Tea Party Movement Means for 
Contemporary Race Relations: A Historical and Contextual Analysis, 7 GEO. J. L. & 
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 201, 202 (2015) (pointing out that racism “remains 
endemic in American society,” and noting the fact that some members of minority 
groups have been successful is not indicative of equal opportunities for all); see also 
Reginald Oh, Regulating White Desire, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 463 (2007). 
5
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the American Dream.15  Such discrimination exists in the job market,16 
access to financial instruments,17 housing,18 education, and many other 
areas.19  In light of these findings, some scholars have suggested the era 
of civil liberties is waning.20  This sad and alarming conclusion is not a 
                                                          
15. Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim & Abigail M. Holden, American 
Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2007) 
(arguing the struggle for greater equality will continue because “the economic and 
psychological wounds of slavery and segregation persist in the form of well-
documented discrimination . . .”).   
16. E.g., Kevin Woodson, Derivative Racial Discrimination, 12 STAN. J. C.R. 
& C.L. 335, 386 (2016) (introducing “derivative racial discrimination” as a form of 
“institutional discrimination that disadvantages black workers derivatively” due to 
socio-cultural differences). 
17. E.g., Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV. 
1071 (2017) (reporting on the prevalence of racism and discrimination in the financial 
world). 
18. See generally Alexander Polikoff, Racial Inequality and the Black Ghetto, 
1 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1 (2006); David R. James, The Racial Ghetto as a Race-
making Situation: The Effects of Residential Segregation on Racial Inequalities and 
Racial Identity, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 407 (1994); Karl Taeuber, The 
Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 339 
(1988). 
19. E.g., Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit 
Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765, 784 (2017) (finding that schools with an 
overrepresentation of racially-diverse students tend to be stricter on developing safety 
measures despite a lack of empirical evidence in favor of this approach); Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, Complimentary Discrimination and Complementary 
Discrimination in Faculty Hiring, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 763, 777 (2010) (identifying 
a “unique” form of racial discrimination in the hiring system of universities). 
20. This position has been defended explicitly in the aftermath of the 2013 
Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (outlawing 
the “coverage-formula” of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was designed to 
guarantee equal voting rights); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, 
The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 
1391 (2015) (arguing the unambiguous message behind Shelby is that the era of civil 
rights is over); Seth Davis, Equal Sovereignty as a Right Against a Remedy, 76 La. L. 
Rev. 83, 118 (2015) (calling the decision in Shelby “not nuanced”); Ilya Shapiro, 
Shelby County and the Vindication of Martin Luther King’s Dream, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 182, 191–92 (2013) (criticizing the critics of Shelby and arguing the 
judgment reaffirms that “widespread, official racial discrimination in voting has 
disappeared.”). See generally REBEKAH HERRICK, MINORITIES AND REPRESENTATION 
IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2017). 
6
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new revelation.21  Rather, it is a renewed reminder of the complexity 
involved in shaping the right conditions to provide all people equal 
opportunities to flourish in life.22 
This lasting reminder illustrates the fragility and vulnerability of 
the victories achieved in the field of civil liberties.23  However, it does 
not herald the end of the civil rights era.24  Rather, this illustration 
prompts us to be cautious.25  The key questions are: how can we pursue 
                                                          
21. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, The More Things Change: New Moves for 
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a Post-Race World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043, 
2096 (2016) (providing an in-depth analysis of decisions reached by the Supreme 
Court in employment, education, and voting rights cases that touch upon the theme of 
racial discrimination and claiming that the Court’s rejectionist approach toward the 
“realness of race” has obviously resulted in the current situation, in which “the Court 
avoids interrogating larger concerns such as structural racism and white supremacy.”); 
see also Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 338–92 
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (suggesting race still matters “because of persistent 
racial inequality in society”). 
22. Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895, 
906 (2016) (pointing to a serious challenge caused by affirmative actions: “these 
policies express that blacks are inferior to whites. Why is that problematic? It is 
problematic because one way to fail to treat people as equals is to express that they 
are not, in fact, equals.”); see also Anita Christina Butera, Assimilation, Pluralism and 
Multiculturalism: The Policy of Racial/Ethnic Identity in America, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 1, 3–8 (2001) (highlighting the main constraints of various models of 
citizenship in addressing racism and discrimination).  
23. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Necessity of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
and the Difficulty of Overcoming Almost a Century of Voting Discrimination, 76 LA. 
L. REV. 181, 185 (2015) (arguing that although the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has 
improved political participation among the black population, “there are still large 
disparities between the actual population of African Americans in the South and the 
actual representation in southern legislatures and in Congress. In part, this is a result 
of residual white hostility to black political participation.”); Anthony J. Gaughan, Has 
the South Changed? Shelby County and the Expansion of the Voter ID Battlefield, 19 
TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 109, 112 (2013) (expecting that Shelby will “retreat” historical 
achievements).  
24. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of Civil Rights as We Know It: Immigration 
and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1492–1510 (2002) 
(arguing immigration will introduce all kinds of new civil rights disputes). 
25. Michael Selmi, Understanding Discrimination in a Post-Racial World, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 855 (2011) (providing a clear analysis of the steps necessary 
to reach an era in which racial discrimination is practically vanished from all 
important aspects of life). 
7
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the courageous path set out in Brown v. Board of Education,26 and how 
can we avoid a revitalization of Plessy v. Ferguson in the future?27  Put 
differently, how can we halt the “insidious and pervasive evil” that is 
racial discrimination?28  These are fundamental questions in an era 
where, unfortunately, race is a decisive factor in the continuation of 
obvious disparities between groups of people.29  We must keep our eyes 
open and remain alert to developments that jeopardize the equality 
many have fought for over recent decades.30 
Admittedly, we have few reasons to be pessimistic about the 
scholarly efforts that have highlighted “the stark reality that race 
matters” in relation to opportunities that help people improve their 
lives.31  Yet, we do have reason to be worried, in general, about the rise 
of intolerance toward newcomers and citizens with immigrant 
backgrounds or ethnic appearances.  In particular, there is cause for 
                                                          
26. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits racial discrimination at public schools); see also Derrick A. 
Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (suggesting the outcome in Brown was probably the 
home version of the freedom and equality message spread by the United States during 
the second world war). 
27. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (upholding the notion that 
separate but equal public education for different racial groups was not at odds with 
the Fourteenth Amendment and effectively allowing the continuation of racial 
segregation in public schools).  
28. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (ruling on the 
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and terming racial discrimination 
in the exercise of voting rights an “evil”). 
29. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting “the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully 
evident” in American society and referring to the presence of racial discrimination in 
the job market, education system, and health sector). 
30. Richard R. W. Brooks, The Banality of Racial Inequality, 124 YALE L. J. 
2626, 2662 (2015) (referring to Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion in Schuette to 
note that race is still relevant because many people suffer from racial discrimination 
in their daily lives. To stop this unfortunate situation—Brooks again quotes Justice 
Sotomayor—we must apply the Constitution in a way that shows awareness of the 
long history of racial discrimination).  
31. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 38 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011) (providing an in-depth analysis of the shift in the equal 
protection jurisprudence, saying that the “end of traditional equality jurisprudence . . . 
should not be conflated with the end of protection for subordinated groups.”).  
8
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concern regarding the emergence and political advancement of 
Islamophobia.32  Nearly sixty years after Dr. King delivered his famous 
speech, we must again be concerned with the inaccessibility of the 
American Dream and the tragic re-emergence of a “system of racial 
caste.”33  Our main concern should be halting the reinforcement of 
segregation that will inevitably increase fundamental disparities 
between groups of people.  The best solution to this problem lies within 
the law and politics relating to immigration.34 
A brief analysis of modern immigration law reveals that many 
stereotypes have been used to justify restrictions with far-reaching 
consequences upon civil rights.  The travel bans instituted by President 
Trump, popularly known as the “Muslim ban,”35 are timely examples 
of regulations that rest strongly on anti-Muslim stereotypes and anti-
immigration rhetoric.36  Similarly, Oklahoma’s Save Our State 
                                                          
32. Cf. David S. Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 168, 210 (2018) (critically discussing some of President Trump’s major anti-
immigration projects). 
33. Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 273 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); see also Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos in the Name of Consistency: 
Affirmative Action and the Odd Legacy of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 101 
DICK. L. REV. 281 (1997). 
34. Cf. Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal Assistance to Immigrants in the 
United States, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619, 662 (2011) (acknowledging that “any 
challenge to the restrictions [of legal assistance to immigrants] must contend with the 
conflicting jurisprudence of immigrant rights”); Saby Ghoshray, Is There a Human-
Rights Dimension to Immigration? Seeking Clarity Through the Prism of Morality 
and Human Survival, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1151, 1168 (2007) (analyzing the law, 
politics, and jurisprudence of immigration). 
35. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter 
Exec. Order 13,769]; Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) 
[hereinafter Exec. Order 13,780] (both orders are titled Protecting the Nation from 
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 
45161 (Sept. 24, 2017), [hereinafter Proclamation 9645] (titled Enhancing Vetting 
Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by 
Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats).  
36. Khaled A. Beydoun, Muslim Bans and the (Re)Making of Political 
Islamophobia, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2017) (arguing the Muslim ban fits 
a long tradition of Islamophobia that has always been present in the American law 
and politics of immigration); Ved P. Nanda, Migrants and Refugees Are Routinely 
Denied the Protection of International Human Rights: What Does the Future Hold?, 
45 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 303, 315 (2017) (arguing the travel ban embodies the 
anti-immigration rhetoric of President Trump). Cf. Adrienne Rodriguez, A Cry for 
9
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Amendment prohibited courts from using Islamic Sharia law or 
international law, and therefore targeted immigrants with Islamic 
backgrounds in particular.37  This initiative rested on the same anti-
Muslim narratives and stereotypes as the recent travel bans. 
What can we say about the contemporary tenor of politics 
surrounding immigration, immigrants, and non-white citizens 
generally?  How shall we appraise, for example, an incident that took 
place not so long ago in Washington D.C.?  A group of teenagers, 
equipped with “Make America Great Again” apparel, were caught in an 
altercation with Nathan Phillips, a Native American activist and Omaha 
tribe elder.  Although Phillips was by no means an immigrant, the 
teenagers allegedly chanted “build the wall!”38—a reference to 
President Trump’s plan to build a wall physically separating the United 
States from Mexico.39 
                                                          
Change: The Fallacy of the American Dream for K-4 Children, 16 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 399, 422 (2017) (suggesting the tougher attitude toward immigration may be 
due to the election of President Trump). 
37. Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia is Creating a 
Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1065 (2012) (exploring 
the roots of Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment and arguing that this legal 
initiative fits the tendency of Islamophobia, which reinforces racism toward Arab 
Americans). For a discussion on the uselessness of anti-Sharia legislation, see 
generally Lee Ann Bambach, Save us from Save Our State: Anti-Sharia Legislative 
Efforts Across the United States and Their Impact, 13 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 72 
(2011) (warning against the negative effects of anti-Sharia legislation upon businesses 
and arguing that State and Federal law provide sufficient remedies to deter human 
rights violations under Sharia law). 
38. This is a contentious example due to the lack of video-recorded evidence 
showing the teenagers shouting “build the wall!” See David Williams & Emanuella 
Grinberg, Teen in Confrontation with Native American Elder Says He Was Trying to 
Defuse the Situation, CNN (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/19/us/teens-mock-native-elder-trnd/index.html.  
39. While referring to the Washington D.C. incident may be contentious, it is 
valuable for the argument this article will develop about the rise of using hostile 
rhetoric in politics to talk about immigration and people with immigrant backgrounds. 
In this respect, “Make America Great Again” is a clear sign of support for President 
Trump, who was elected after running a campaign full of anti-Islam and anti-
immigration rhetoric. See Lindsay Pérez Huber, Make America Great Again: Donald 
Trump, Racist Nativism and the Virulent Adherence to White Supremacy Amid U.S. 
Demographic Change, 10 CHARLESTON L. REV. 215, 224 (2016). 
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How can we rationalize accusations of disloyalty against politicians 
with immigrant backgrounds?40  Take, for example, Rashida Tlaib, who 
is among the first ever Muslims in Congress and one of only two 
Muslim women ever elected to the House of Representatives.  She has 
been considered, by some, to be a potential danger because of her 
Islamic and Palestinian background.  One Florida city commissioner 
went so far as to accuse Representative Tlaib “of being a ‘danger’ who 
might ‘blow up’ the U.S. Capitol.”41  Similar accusations have been 
raised against Republican Shahid Shafi, elected Southlake City Council 
member and vice chairman of the Tarrant County Republican Party in 
Texas.  His Muslim background has been used to portray him as an 
unreliable person.  In a special rally, the Tarrant Republicans asked the 
party, in vain, to remove Sahid Shafi from his political post.  As a 
practicing Muslim, the Tarrant Republicans reasoned Shafi would not 
be able to represent the Party, since “not [all] Republicans . . . think 
Islam is safe or acceptable in the U.S., in Tarrant County, and in the 
[Republican Party].”42 
Does the language used today to talk about immigration and those 
with immigrant backgrounds or non-white appearances indicate that we 
have entered an entirely new era?  No.  Immigration has always been a 
                                                          
40. Most notably against former President Barack Obama, accused of secretly 
being a Muslim ruling the United States. See, e.g., Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party 
Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827, 848 (2011) 
(discussing how President Obama was accused of being born outside the United States 
and harboring a hidden faith: Islam). 
41. See Holly Rosenkrantz, Florida Official Says U.S. Rep. Rashida Tlaib May 
“Blow Up” Capitol, CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/florida-official-says-rep-rashida-tlaib-may-blow-
up-the-capitol/ (quoting Anabelle Lima-Taub, a Florida city commissioner, who 
referred to Rashida Tlaib as a “Hamas-loving anti-Semite”).  Similar accusations have 
been raised against Muslim representative Ilhan Omar. See Katie Mettler, ‘Just Deal,’ 
Muslim Lawmaker Ilhan Omar Says to Pastor Who Complained About Hijabs on 
House Floor, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2018/12/07/just-deal-muslim-lawmaker-
ilhan-omar-says-pastor-who-complained-about-hijabs-house-
floor/?utm_term=.cf94512b35c8 (quoting critics of allowing representatives to wear 
headscarves in the House of Representatives). 
42. Adeel Hassan, Texas Republicans Rally Behind Muslim Official as Some 
Try to Oust Him Over Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/us/muslim-republican-shahid-shafi-texas.html 
(quoting Dorrie O’Brien). 
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subject of political debate in the United States.43  Are the measures that 
target some religious groups for special bans and restrictions unique in 
their sort?  Not really.  In the past, some immigrants were expelled from 
the colonies by powerful settlers because of their “heretic” views.  More 
generally, some colonies were “not open” to Baptists, Jews, and 
Quakers.  And, until very recently, Catholics in the United States 
suffered from widespread feelings of animosity and prejudice dating 
back from the Irish migration wave during the nineteenth century.44 
Can we say that actual or propagated bans that single out the 
Islamic faith for special prohibitions and restrictions—such as those 
targeting Muslims qua Muslims—add an entirely new perspective to 
the debate about the law and politics of immigration in the United 
States?  Even this is not the case.  For decades, immigrants from 
predominantly Muslim nations, including non-Muslim immigrants such 
as Christians, were deprived the right to become full citizens of the 
United States.45  In the years following the 2001 terrorist attacks, racial 
profiling, discrimination, and hatred have been major issues for those 
                                                          
43. Cf. Pooja R. Dadhania, Deporting Undesirable Women, 9 UC IRVINE L. 
REV. 53 (2018). See also Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights in the 
Trump Administration: Law and Policy Making by Executive Order, 57 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 611, 613–14 (2017) (arguing that history contains many examples of 
anti-immigration policies); Amanda Frost, Independence and Immigration, 89 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 485 (2016) (analyzing immigration law from a historical perspective); David 
B. Oppenheimer, Swati Prakash & Rachel Burns, Playing the Trump Card: The 
Enduring Legacy of Racism in Immigration Law, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 6 
(2016) (providing a historical overview of immigration policies); Jill E. Family, The 
Future Relief of Immigration Law, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 393, 395 (2017) (discussing the 
future of deportation law and noting that immigration has always been part of the 
political debate).  
44. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: OVERCOMING 
THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 7 (2012). 
45. Id.; see also Beydoun, supra note 36, at 1735. Cf. Khaled A. Beydoun, 
Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of Arab American Identity, 69 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (2013) (exploring the roots and meaning of 
“whiteness,” which was for a long period a requirement for a successful citizenship 
application, and pointing to the lack of scholarly attention on cases challenging this 
racial discrimination); Jonathan Weinberg, Proving Identity, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 
742 (2017) (arguing the Naturalization Act of 1790 made it practically impossible for 
a group of Chinese immigrants to become citizens of the United States); Cheryl I. 
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1744–45 (1993) (arguing 
that “whiteness” is important because of the associated privileges that come with it). 
12
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with immigrant backgrounds in the United States.46  This group 
includes not only Muslims, but others whose appearances are similar to 
adherents of the Islamic faith,47 including those with headscarves or 
turbans, beards, non-Hispanic brown complexions, and Middle-Eastern 
postures.48 
Our brief analysis of the law and politics surrounding immigration 
reveals that neither the strong language used in connection with 
immigrants, nor the policies related to immigration, indicate that we 
have entered a new anti-immigration era.  In both cases, stereotypes 
appear to be persistently present, governing the tone of the debate as 
well as the seriousness of the interventions designed to regulate 
immigration.49  These persistent stereotypes have generated serious 
                                                          
46. Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 243 (2005) (“a 2002 report released by the FBI reveals 481 
hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims in the year 2001, representing an increase of 
1600 percent over the previous year”); see also Makau Mutua, Terrorism and Human 
Rights: Power, Culture, and Subordination, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002) 
(exploring the roots of the “War on Terrorism” and the notion of the “‘us-and-them’ 
dichotomy”); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law, 
66 EMORY L.J. 669 (2017) (discussing how the national security agenda has shaped 
contemporary immigration policies); Sara Mahdavi, Held Hostage: Identity 
Citizenship of Iranian Americans, 11 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 211 (2006) (“In the 
aftermath of September 11, the federal government has revived the practice of 
profiling people who appear to be Muslim, Arab, or Middle Eastern . . .”); Susan M. 
Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After 
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 295, 295–96 (2002) (critical of the post-9/11 security measures that were 
“‘pushing the envelope’ in restricting civil liberties in the name of national security”). 
47. Romtin Parvaresh, Prayer for Relief: Anti-Muslim Discrimination as Racial 
Discrimination, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1313 (2014); Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and 
Stones, the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 33, 42–43 (2009). See generally Vijay Sekhon, The Civil Rights of 
“Others”: Antiterrorism, the Patriot Act, and Arab and South Asian American Rights 
in Post-9/11 American Society, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117 (2003) (discussing how 
non-Muslims have suffered from racial profiling and hatred following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks).  
48. Khaled A. Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4 (2018) 
(exploring the consequences of purposefully manifesting or hiding the Islamic faith 
in public).  
49. Today, the explicit use of anti-immigration rhetoric has become common 
within the American political establishment. It has provoked the immigration debate 
and has shaped the contours of contemporary political discourse. The 2018 midterm 
elections showed a clear increase in Islamophobic rhetoric within political campaigns. 
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concern regarding undocumented immigrants, illegal border crossings, 
and national security threats.  The latter concern is often used to justify 
the special need for radical measures in the fight against immigration—
measures that range from building a separation wall between the United 
States and Mexico,50 to issuing travel bans that deny citizens of some 
countries access to the United States.51 
People with immigrant backgrounds often suffer harassment, 
hatred, and racial profiling as a consequence of this harsh political 
reality.52  Remaining silent in the face of this discrimination only 
advances the process of creating parallel societies with second-class 
citizens.53  This interim conclusion exhorts us to be cautious.  While the 
inaccessibility of the American Dream remains a larger issue, the re-
emergence of Islamophobia is especially concerning.  This article thus 
focuses on the challenges faced by the Muslim community today.  
                                                          
More generally, the 2016 election of President Trump resulted in a tougher attitude 
toward immigration and immigrants. This attitude has manifested itself in two ways. 
First, the language used to discuss immigration is generally aggressive in tone. 
Second, there is a proliferation of actual or propagated restrictions that aim to reduce 
immigration numbers. What is striking about both political developments is the 
abundant use of stereotypes. See generally Nanda, supra note 36. 
50. See Nick Miroff & Josh Dawsey, Trump Wants His Border Barrier to be 
Painted Black with Spikes. He Has Other Ideas, Too, WASH. POST (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/trump-wants-his-border-barrier-to-be-
painted-black-with-spikes-he-has-other-ideas-too/2019/05/16/b088c07e-7676-11e9-
b3f5-5673edf2d127_story.html. See generally Moria Paz, Between the Kingdom and 
the Desert Sun: Human Rights, Immigration, and Border Walls, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 1 (2016) (providing a thought-provoking explanation for the rise of physical walls 
separating states). 
51. Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 243, 257 (2017) (describing how the Trump administration framed the travel ban 
for different purposes. To supporters of a stricter immigration policy, it was presented 
as the promised Muslim ban. In courts, however, it was defended as a necessary 
security measure). Cf. Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump Ice Age: Contextualizing 
the New Immigration Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253, 256–77 (2018) 
(arguing that many of the immigration policies today continue the line that was set 
out by preceding administrations). 
52. Cf. Lawrence J. Trautman, Presidential Impeachment: A Contemporary 
Analysis, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 529, 564 (2019) (listing examples of racism and 
discrimination involving the Trump administration).  
53. Ali, supra note 37, at 1031, 1067 (arguing that “growing anxiety and 
antagonism toward Islam and Muslims—Islamophobia—as exhibited by the 
Oklahoma law is creating a distinct second-class citizenry.”).  
14
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Specifically, this article explores how the contemporary anti-
immigration climate—particularly the increased focus on border 
protection—has impacted the Muslim community. 
Part I of this article focuses on recent public decisions burdening 
Muslims, such as the travel bans implemented by President Trump, and 
analyzes the legality of those policies.  Part II looks critically at how 
particular steps taken in the public and private fields have contributed 
to the racialization of Muslims.54  This Part explores the stereotypes and 
conspiracy theories developed to gain political support for far reaching 
anti-immigration policies.  Not only do these policies aim to limit 
opportunities for legal immigration to the United States, they 
specifically target people with immigrant backgrounds, such as the 
Muslim community.55  In Part III, the article draws upon this theoretical 
framework to introduce a strategy to overcome this era of fear, anxiety, 
and intolerance toward newcomers and those with immigrant 
backgrounds.  This article concludes that the racialization of people 
with immigrant backgrounds contributes to the creation of parallel 
societies.  This development, in turn, negatively affects equal access to 
fundamental liberties.  Consequently, not everyone has an equal ability 
to flourish in life and to achieve the promises of the Declaration of 
Independence that made the American Dream possible.  A final 
reflection about the tendency of singling out certain groups for special 
prohibitions follows in the epilogue of this article. 
I. PROTECT OUR NATION FROM MUSLIMS 
In what has been considered Donald Trump’s “most infamous anti-
Muslim screed,” he called for “a total and complete shutdown of 
Muslims entering the United States.”56  This dramatic call came just 
days after the 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino.  At the time, 
                                                          
54. Nagwa Ibrahim, The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA 
J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 121, 142 (2008) (positing that “racialization of Muslims” has 
resulted in “a new zone of lawlessness where [Muslims] are neither citizen nor alien, 
but rather [adherents of the] inherently evil world called ‘Islam.’”).  
55. Cf. MUSLIM ADVOCATES, RUNNING ON HATE (2019) (surveying the 
prevalence of anti-Muslim rhetoric in the context of the 2018 midterm elections). 
56. Gregory Krieg, Trump’s History of Anti-Muslim Rhetoric Hits Dangerous 
New Low, CNN (Nov. 30, 2017), https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/29/politics/donald-
trump-muslim-attacks/index.html (quoting President Trump advocating for a Muslim 
ban until the authorities “figure out what the hell is going on.”). 
15
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Donald Trump was a frontrunner in the Republican Party’s primaries 
for the 2016 presidential elections.  In a sense, his call for singling out 
Muslims for a special entry ban did not come as a surprise.57  This was 
not Donald Trump’s first anti-Muslim plan.  Prior to these statements, 
Donald Trump had shown a strong aversion to granting asylum to 
refugees coming from Syria, comparing them to the “Trojan horse.”58  
He also suggested closing mosques, colorfully describing them as 
places where “some of the hatred—the absolute hatred—is coming 
from.”59  Thus, the calls to introduce an entry ban singling out Muslims 
fit a longer tradition of proposals targeting both Muslims and their 
religion for special restrictions and prohibitions.60  However, this call 
to stop Muslims coming to the United States was something more than 
putting out an anti-immigration feeler—it set the tone for a new, anti-
Muslim rhetoric.61 
The call to stop Muslims from entering the United States soon 
proved to be more than political rhetoric.  In 2016, newly-elected 
President Trump delivered on his campaign rhetoric.  Upon taking 
office, he issued two Executive Orders and one Proclamation, 
predominantly targeting travelers from Muslim-majority countries.62  
                                                          
57. Cf. Vienna Flores, Competing Paradigms of Immigrant Human Rights in 
America, 21 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 459, 466 (2015).  
58. Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline 
of Trump’s Comments About Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-
hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-
muslims/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.418b059fabaa (providing an overview of anti-
Muslim statements made by President Trump). 
59. Id.  
60. Cf. Pérez Huber, supra note 39, at 225 (on Trump’s attitude toward the 
Latino community). 
61. See, e.g., Johnson & Hauslohner, supra note 58 (quoting Trump saying: “I 
think Islam hates us.”). See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, 9/11 and 11/9: The Law, 
Lives and Lies that Bind, 20 CUNY L. REV. 455 (2017) (discussing President Trump’s 
anti-Muslim agenda). 
62. Matthew J. Lindsay, The Perpetual Invasion: Past as Prologue in 
Constitutional Immigration Law, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 369, 389 (2018) 
(pointing out President Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric during the presidential 
campaign was something more than a slip of the tongue).  
16
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The “Muslim Ban” became a reality,63 throwing the United States back 
to a dark era of racial discrimination.64  This Part analyzes the history 
of the travel bans and the various case law addressing the lawfulness of 
these restrictions. 
A. Executive Order 13,769 
Despite harsh criticism from lawyers, political leaders, and 
commentators, the newly elected President introduced Executive Order 
13,769, popularly known as the “Muslim Ban,” just days after the 
presidential election.65  By signing this order, titled Protecting the 
Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, the 
President paved the way for the realization of one of his major election 
pledges: enacting a travel ban for Muslims.66  After all, Donald Trump’s 
election campaign was highly dedicated to border protection and 
national security issues, focusing specifically on who enters the country 
and how to stop those “invaders.”67 
                                                          
63. Id. For an extensive overview of travel restrictions targeting Muslims, see 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the Muslim Bans, 75 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1475 (2018). 
64. Julia G. Young, Making America 1920 again? Nativism and US 
Immigration, Past and Present, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 217 (2017) 
(comparing the anti-immigration era of 1920 to the present day and concluding there 
are many similarities between the two eras of nativism). 
65. Lindsay, supra note 62; see also Jennifer Lee Barrow, Trump’s Travel Ban: 
Lawful but Ill-Advised, 41 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 691 (2018) (arguing that border 
and admission questions fall under the authority of the president, making Executive 
Order 13,769 lawful); Michael B. Mukasey, Judicial Independence: The Fortress 
Threatened from Within, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1223, 1232 (2017) (defending the ban 
as a matter of national security).  
66. Exec. Order 13,769, supra note 35, at 8977; see also Harold A. Lloyd, 
Speaker Meaning and the Interpretation and Construction of Executive Orders, 8 
WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 319, 332 (2018) (analyzing Trump’s anti-Muslim 
rhetoric and its contribution to the enacted travel restrictions). 
67. Cf. Stuart Chinn, Threats to Democratic Stability: Comparing the Elections 
of 2016 and 1860, 77 MD. L. REV. 291, 293 (2017) (noting that immigrants, Muslims, 
and Muslim-Americans were “central parts” of President Trump’s presidential 
campaign); A. Reid Monroe-Sheridan, Frankly Unthinkable: The Constitutional 
Failings of President Trump’s Proposed Muslim Registry, 70 ME. L. REV. 1 (2017) 
(discussing the constitutionality of President Trump’s proposed “Muslim registry”).  
17
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Executive Order 13,769 aimed to protect the United States against 
foreign terrorism, drawing on experiences from the 9/11 attacks.  The 
main purposes of this order were to fill an important security gap and 
eliminate opportunities for foreign nationals to commit acts of terrorism 
within the United States.68  The Order urged authorities to approach 
foreign nationals’ travel requests with stricter scrutiny.69  The main 
argument behind this tougher attitude toward immigration and border 
protection was that: 
[the] United States cannot, and should not, admit those who do not 
support the Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies 
over American law. In addition, the United States should not admit 
those who engage in acts of bigotry or hatred (including ‘‘honor’’ 
killings, other forms of violence against women, or the persecution 
of those who practice religions different from their own) or those 
who would oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual 
orientation.70 
Upon first read, Executive Order 13,769 singled out troublemakers 
for special travel restrictions.  But more specifically, this order 
suspended—categorically—the issuance of travel visas and other 
“immigration benefits” to nationals of “countries of particular 
concern.”71  Although not all explicitly mentioned in the text, these 
countries of particular concern included Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, 
Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.  This was evident from the decision to 
revoke all issued and valid visas—except diplomatic visas—to 
nationals from these seven countries.72 
The issued travel restrictions targeted people from Muslim-
majority countries in particular.  Put differently, Executive Order 
13,769 predominantly singled out Muslims for a special prohibition: 
                                                          
68. Exec. Order 13,769, supra note 35, at 8977 (in Section 1, the Order explains 
that “while the visa-issuance process was reviewed and amended after the September 
11 attacks to better detect would-be terrorists from receiving visas, these measures did 
not stop attacks by foreign nationals who were admitted to the United States.”). 
69. Id.  
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 8979 (only mentioning Syria by name for purposes of halting the entry 
of refugees).  
72. Tootkaboni v. Trump, No. 17-CV-10154, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14241, at 
*5 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017). 
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travel to the United States.73  The restrictions consisted of a general ban 
on traveling to the United States for a period of 90 days.  Additionally, 
the order urged the Secretary of State to halt the admission of 
refugees—regardless of their origin—for a period of 120 days, and to 
suspend the entry of Syrian refugees indefinitely, claiming the presence 
of pressing security needs.74 
However, Executive Order 13,769 did allow the Secretaries of State 
and Homeland Security “to admit individuals to the United States as 
refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but only so long as 
they determine that the admission of such individuals as refugees is in 
the national interest. . . .”75  In this respect, the ban urged authorities to 
expedite refugee applications from persecuted members of religious 
minority groups who would not pose security or welfare risks upon their 
arrival into the United States.76  Despite the presence of this tiny exit 
door, scholars still criticized the ban for its vagueness, arbitrariness, and 
willingness to stigmatize, drawing on strong anti-Muslim stereotypes, 
such as honor killings and other forms of gender-related violence.77 
                                                          
73. Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 
2192 (2018); Josh Blackman, The Legal Resistance, 9 FAULKNER L. REV. 45, 56 
(2017); Latoya Tyson, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Executive Order No. 13,780 as a 
Disguise for a Muslim Ban: The Implications of International Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 40 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 140, 141, 147 (2017) (all arguing Executive 
Order 13,769 was designed to stop Muslims from visiting the United States).  
74. Exec. Order 13,769, supra note 35, at 8979 (arguing that the entry of Syrian 
refugees could harm national interests).  
75. Id. 
76. Id. (stating people in transfer could also be exempted). For a critique of the 
choice to favor religious minority groups, see Barrow, supra note 65, at 694, 715 
(noting that “giving preference to individual refugees on the condition that the 
‘religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of 
nationality’ is a poor policy choice, reflecting an oversimplification of and common 
misconception of religious persecution.”). 
77. Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez, Eroding Immigration Exceptionalism: 
Administrative Law in the Supreme Court’s Immigration Jurisprudence, 86 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 215, 217 (2018) (criticizing Executive Order 13,769 as “vague”); Kaila C. 
Randolph, Executive Order 13,769 and America’s Longstanding Practice of 
Institutionalized Racial Discrimination Towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 47 
STETSON L. REV. 1, 35 (2017); Melissa Brooke Winkler, Executive Order “Protecting 
the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”: Violating First 
Amendment Rights or Altering Constitutional Provisions Granting Foreign Policy 
Powers to the President?, 34 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 79, 83 (2017) (critics questioned 
why countries that have supported terrorism, such as Saudi Arabia, were not on the 
19
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Executive Order 13,769 caused a wave of public indignation and 
worldwide condemnation after media reports leaked footage of dozens 
of stuck and detained travelers.78  The enacted travel restriction further 
provoked heated debate among legal scholars and immigration 
attorneys.  This debate was specifically geared toward claims of First 
Amendment violations,79 given the specific political context in which 
the travel restrictions were realized,80 and the clear presence of 
favoritism toward religious minority groups.81 
It did not take long before this travel restriction was challenged in 
court.  In fact, the litigation journey started just hours after the 
announcement of the restrictions.  On January 28, 2017, in Darweesh 
v. Trump, District Judge Ann Donnelly ordered a temporary injunction 
                                                          
list of countries affected by Executive Order 13,769); Sahar F. Aziz, A Muslim 
Registry: The Precursor to Internment?, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 779, 825 (2017); Eunice 
Lee, Non-Discrimination in Refugee and Asylum Law (Against Travel Ban 1.0 and 
2.0), 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 464 (2017) (both positing that the aim to keep honor 
killers outside the United States is an obvious reference to Muslims). 
78. Enid Trucios-Haynes & Marianna Michael, Mobilizing a Community: The 
Effect of President Trump’s Executive Orders on the Country’s Interior, 22 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 577, 590–95 (2018) (noting the role both media and attorneys played 
in challenging the lawfulness of Executive Order 13,769, specifically drawing 
attention to the allegedly unlawful detention of travelers coming from the banned 
countries). For a discussion on the importance of media in another context, see Mimi 
A. Akel, The Good, the Bad, and the Evils of the #MeToo Movement’s Sexual 
Harassment Allegations in Today’s Society: A Cautionary Tale Regarding the Cost of 
These Claims to the Victims, the Accused, and Beyond, 49 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 103, 
106 (2018). 
79. Earl M. Maltz, The Constitution and the Trump Travel Ban, 22 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 391, 396–407 (2018) (critically discussing the First Amendment 
argument). Cf. Gary Feinerman, Civility, Dignity, Respect, and Virtue, 71 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 140, 144 (2018) (briefly highlighting the Establishment Clause 
argument). 
80. For a discussion of the importance of the broader political context for 
determining the lawfulness of the imposed travel restrictions, see John G. Roberts, Jr. 
et al., In Tribute: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (2018) 
(referring to the travel ban controversy and rhetorically asking “what if (some) words 
are part of the problem?”). Cf. Anton Sorkin, Make Law, Not War: Solving the 
Faith/Equality Crisis, 12 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 663, 723 (2018) (briefly discussing the 
concept of using “extrinsic” evidence to help prove the main objective behind certain 
actions and suggesting this approach was used in the context of President Trump’s 
travel bans).  
81. Keith A. Petty, Duty and Disobedience: The Conflict of Conscience and 
Compliance in the Trump Era, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 55, 79 (2018).  
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halting the removal of passengers with valid travel documents who 
were affected by the imposed travel restriction.82 
On the same day, in Aziz v. Trump, District Judge Leonie Brinkema 
from Virginia granted a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), 
ordering authorities to provide lawyers access to affected travelers at 
Dulles International Airport who were in possession of valid entry 
documents, such as green cards.  Judge Brinkema further enjoined 
authorities from removing those passengers.83 
In another TRO granted one day after Darweesh and Aziz, District 
Judge Allison Burroughs of Massachusetts also enjoined authorities 
from removing affected passengers in possession of lawful travel 
documents and who, “absent the Executive Order, would be legally 
authorized to enter the United States.”84  This TRO also ordered 
authorities “to notify airlines that have flights arriving at Logan Airport 
of this Order and the fact that individuals on these flights [cannot] be 
detained or returned based solely on the basis of the Executive Order.”85 
                                                          
82. Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 28, 2017) (two Iraqi men, Mr. Darweesh and Mr. Alshawi, were on their way to 
the United States with valid travel visas. However, both were banned from entering 
the country and put in detention because of the travel restrictions) (case information, 
available at https://www.aclu.org/cases/darweesh-v-trump (last visited Feb. 15, 
2019)); see also Matthew R. Segal, Civil Rights and State Courts in the Trump Era, 
12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 49, 58 (2018) (“Federal litigation aimed at President 
Trump’s immigration crackdown has been important and, at times, wildly 
successful”); Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and 
Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 49 (2017) (briefly referencing the 
injunction issued in Darweesh); Carson Holloway, Judicial Review and Subjective 
Intentions, 9 FAULKNER L. REV. 1, 1 (2017) (referencing Darweesh and noting that 
“those pressing this claim [against the travel restrictions] found a sympathetic ear in 
some corners of the federal judiciary”).  
83. Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-116, 2017 WL 386549, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 
2017). 
84. Tootkaboni v. Trump, No. 17-CV-10154, 2017 WL 386550, at *1 (D. Mass. 
Jan. 29, 2017) (motion for extension of TRO declined in Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 
F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2017)). 
85. Id.; see also Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1099 (2018) (pointing to the geographical limitedness of the 
TRO in Tootkaboni, and the confusion it has caused regarding the question of who is 
allowed to enter the country). 
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Although none of these temporary orders explicitly required 
authorities to provide entry to affected travelers,86 the Trump 
administration sharply criticized these legal decisions87 and reiterated 
that it would continue enforcing the travel restrictions “humanely and 
with professionalism . . . to protect the homeland.”88  The criticism, 
however, did not come only from the Trump administration.  Legal 
scholars also expressed criticism of the way the judges blocked 
enforcement of the Executive order.89  Specifically, the critics were 
concerned about the issuance of nationwide injunctions enjoining 
authorities from enforcing the travel restrictions.90  Critics questioned 
the constitutionality of issuing geographically unlimited restraining 
orders, or nationwide injunctions.91  This criticism arose specifically in 
the aftermath of the court’s decision—first granting a nationwide TRO 
and later denying the stay thereof, pending an emergency appeal—in 
Washington v. Trump, where the state of Washington, later joined by 
                                                          
86. An exception to this: Mohammed v. Trump, No. CV 17-00786 AB, 2017 
WL 438750, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (enjoining the authorities from 
“blocking the entry” of anyone traveling on a valid visa, though affected by the travel 
restrictions). 
87. Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, New Sheriff, Old Problems: Advancing Access 
to Justice Under the Trump Administration, 127 YALE L.J. F. 254, 267 (2017).  
88. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Statement on Compliance with Court 
Orders and the President’s Executive Order (Jan. 29, 2017) (transcript available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/29/dhs-statement-compliance-Court-orders-and-
presidents-executive-order).  
89. Frost, supra note 85, at 1068 (referring to the criticism that federal courts 
lack authority to impose nation-wide injunctions). For examples of such criticism, see 
generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2095 (2017). 
90. Frost, supra note 85, at 1072, 1090 (advocating in favor of nationwide 
injunctions in three circumstances: (i) if it is the only way for complete relief; (ii) if it 
avoids irreparable injury; and (iii) if geographically curtailed injunctions would end 
in chaos). 
91. Josh Blackman, The 9th Circuit’s Contrived Comedy of Errors in 
Washington v. Trump, 95 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 18, 21–22 (2017); see also Matthew 
Erickson, Who, What, and Where: A Case for a Multifactor Balancing Test as a 
Solution to Abuse of Nationwide Injunctions, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 331, 352 (2018) 
(advocating for a balancing test to assess the necessity of nationwide injunctions). 
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Minnesota, challenged the lawfulness of the enacted travel 
restrictions.92 
While both the district court and the court of appeals appeared to 
sympathize with the states’ view that the travel restrictions had 
negatively affected them, neither court thoroughly engaged with 
allegations that the travel restrictions were designed to ban Muslims 
from entering the United States.  This was likely due to the highly 
“sensitive interests” involved in the litigation and the relatively limited 
task of the court.93  Particularly relevant here is the courts’ discussion 
of separation of powers and the judiciary’s role to review immigration 
policies.  District Judge James Robart admitted he lacked authority 
to create policy or judge the wisdom of any particular policy 
promoted by the other two branches. That is the work of the 
legislative and executive branches and of the citizens of this country 
who ultimately exercise democratic control over those branches. The 
role of the Judiciary and this Court, is limited to ensuring that the 
actions taken by the other two branches comport with our country’s 
laws, and more importantly, our Constitution.94 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit continued this discussion on 
separation of powers.  While assessing the emergency motion of the 
Federal Government to stay the TRO, pending an emergency appeal, 
the court reasoned that 
[although] our jurisprudence has long counseled deference to the 
political branches on matters of immigration and national security, 
neither the Supreme Court nor our Court has ever held that Courts 
lack the authority to review executive action in those arenas for 
compliance with the Constitution. To the contrary, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly and explicitly rejected the notion that the 
political branches have unreviewable authority over immigration or 
                                                          
92. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *1 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting a nationwide TRO), aff’d, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 
2017) (denying a stay of the granted TRO). 
93. Cf. id. 
94. Id. 
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are not subject to the Constitution when policymaking in that 
context.95 
This precedential backdrop led the Ninth Circuit to the conclusion 
that it had the authority to review the lawfulness of executive actions.96  
In ruling on the emergency motion to stay the TRO, the court employed 
a four-part test: 
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will 
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and 
(4) where the public interest lies.97 
The Ninth Circuit concluded—preliminarily—that the Government 
failed to meet its burden regarding the first two elements.98  The court 
further noted that the last two elements of the test also did not weigh in 
                                                          
95. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) (also refusing—
with reference to Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) aff’d sub nom 
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271—any geographical limit of the TRO, because 
“such a fragmented immigration policy would run afoul of the constitutional and 
statutory requirement for uniform immigration law and policy.”). 
96. Id. at 1164 (positing that “although Courts owe considerable deference to 
the President’s policy determinations with respect to immigration and national 
security, it is beyond question that the federal judiciary retains the authority to 
adjudicate constitutional challenges to executive action.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw 
& David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An 
Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 572 (2018) 
(arguing that compared to the district court’s discussion of the separation of powers 
argument, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of this argument was less political in nature, 
rather it was based “(facially) on more technical statutory interpretation.”). 
97. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 
1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012) and noting that the first two questions are in fact leading, 
while the last two steps matter only after the first two questions have been answered).   
98. Id. (concluding that authorities had failed to prove the enacted regime of 
travel restrictions “provides what due process requires, such as notice and a hearing 
prior to restricting an individual’s ability to travel. . . . Rather, . . . the Government 
argues that most or all of the individuals affected have no rights under the Due Process 
Clause” and that the authorities had failed to prove that the absence of a stay would 
cause irreparable injury). 
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favor of the Government.99  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit denied the 
stay.100 
In response to this decision, President Trump quickly took to 
Twitter, writing: “SEE YOU IN COURT, THE SECURITY OF OUR 
NATION IS AT STAKE!”101  The President’s challenge to go to court 
soon became a reality.  Although the nationwide injunction had 
survived the first round of litigation, opponents of the travel restrictions 
continued to challenge the Executive order.  The growing body of court 
rulings against the newly-enacted travel restrictions gave rise to a new 
category of arguments, challenging the legality of the restrictions based 
on religious discrimination, and specifically anti-Muslim 
discrimination.102  But courts showed reservation about accepting such 
claims.103 
However, in granting the preliminary injunction in Aziz v. Trump 
and enjoining authorities from enforcing a key section of Executive 
Order 13,769, the court noted the ambiguity of the Trump 
administration’s reasoning for the travel restriction.104  Inside the 
                                                          
99. Id. at 1168–69 (“the States [of Washington and Minnesota] have offered 
ample evidence that if the Executive Order were reinstated even temporarily, it would 
substantially injure [them]” and concluding that both parties can draw on public 
interest arguments). 
100. Id. at 1169; see also S. Cagle Juhan & Greg Rustico, Jurisdiction and 
Judicial Self-Defense, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 123, 135 (2017) (defending the 
Ninth Circuit’s anonymously written decision: “anonymity frames the debate in 
institutional terms.”).  
101. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 9, 2017, 3:35 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/829836231802515457.  
102. Admittedly, allegations suggesting the enacted travel restrictions incarnate 
the promised Muslim ban were raised previously. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 
847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017) (saying the states have provided evidence related 
to the anti-Muslim character of the enacted travel restrictions). 
103. For a denial of the Establishment Clause arguments in relation to the 
imposed travel restrictions, see Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. 
Mass. 2017) (“[The argument] that [Executive Order 13,769] favors Muslims over 
Christians, in violation of the Establishment Clause [is flawed] . . . Nothing [in the 
text of the Executive Order] compels a finding that Christians are preferred to any 
other group.”). 
104. See Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 739 (E.D. Va. 2017) (enjoining 
the authorities from enforcing § 3(c) of Executive Order 13,769, and specifying the 
targeted groups); see also Josh Blackman, The Domestic Establishment Clause, 23 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 345, 346 (2018) (critical of accepting the Establishment 
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courtroom, the administration defended the restriction on neutral 
grounds, presenting it as a necessary security measure.  But outside the 
court, the restriction was defended as a necessary means to address the 
“Muslim problem.”105  In discussing this ambiguity, the district court 
stated: 
The Establishment Clause concerns . . . do not involve an assessment 
of the merits of the president’s national security judgment. Instead, 
the question is whether the [executive order] was animated by 
national security concerns at all, as opposed to the impermissible 
motive of, in the context of entry, disfavoring one religious group 
and, in the area of refugees, favoring another religious group.106 
The court further noted a “conceptual link between [the promised] 
Muslim ban and the [imposed travel restrictions].”107  Referencing 
Rudy Giuliani’s comments about the rationale behind the travel 
restriction,108 the court concluded that the imposed restriction was not 
designed to meet a pressing security need.109  More importantly, the 
court enervated the argument that authorities would become powerless 
if the imposed travel restriction was to be interpreted as a Muslim ban.  
The court qualified this fear as “exaggerated” and found the “the dearth 
of evidence indicating a national security purpose” persuasive.110  The 
serious engagement of the court with this argument against the travel 
                                                          
Clause arguments in immigration law cases, positing that such arguments have “no 
place in the realm of foreign affairs and national security.”). 
105. See Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 730 (discussing President Trump’s relationship 
with the enacted travel restrictions, before and after assuming office). See generally 
Chacón, supra note 51, at 257 (arguing the enacted travel restriction regime was 
defended differently for various uses: “to supporters, it was the promised Muslim ban, 
but to Courts, it was not.”). 
106. Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 735–36. 
107. Id. at 737 (noting the “discriminatory purpose” of the action is what matters 
for purposes of Establishment Clause analysis). 
108. Id. at 736 (Giuliani had linked the imposed restrictions to the promised 
Muslim ban). 
109. Id. (saying that the context in which the travel restrictions were designed 
“bolsters the . . . argument that the [choice to enact those travel restrictions] was not 
motivated by rational national security concerns.”). 
110. Id. at 737. 
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restriction makes Aziz an exceptional case.111  Perhaps even more 
importantly, Aziz is the first ruling in which the court explicitly hinted 
to the unconstitutional nature of the travel restriction, concluding 
“enjoining unconstitutional action by the Executive Branch is always in 
the public’s interest.”112 
While litigation continued in the aftermath of Aziz and Washington 
v. Trump,113 the Trump administration announced it would issue a new 
round of travel restrictions more “tailored to [the] very bad decision” of 
the Ninth Circuit.114  On March 6, 2017, almost six weeks after the 
announcement of the first Executive order, the administration revoked 
Executive Order 13,769 and issued Executive Order 13,780, also titled 
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United 
                                                          
111. Admittedly, arguments addressing the legality of the enacted travel 
restriction from the angle of non-Establishment were discussed previously in 
Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2017) (rejecting the 
argument that the imposed travel restrictions violate the guarantees under the 
Establishment Clause, reasoning that the language used in Executive Order 13,769 is 
neutral and does not favor one religious group over another). 
112. Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 739. Cf. Beatrice Catherine Franklin, 
Irreparability, I Presume: On Assuming Irreparable Harm for Constitutional 
Violations in Preliminary Injunctions, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623, 665 (2014) 
(jurisprudential support in favor of the Aziz court’s position).  
113. Not all litigation concerned the constitutionality of the imposed travel 
restrictions or sought to enjoin authorities from the enforcement of the newly enacted 
restrictions. However, the cases related in some way to the broader legal debate 
surrounding the restrictions. See, e.g., Decker v. Washington, No. 3:17-CV-00254, 
2017 WL 891318, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2017) (asking the court to overturn the 
Ninth Circuit’s denial of stay decision); McDonnell v. City & Cty. of Denver, 238 F. 
Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Colo. 2017) (on the lawfulness of the authorities’ decision to 
prevent an anti-travel ban demonstration); Taiebat v. Scialabba, No. 17-cv-0805-PJH, 
2017 WL 839807 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017) (aimed at changing man’s legal status as 
non-immigrant working and living in the United States, as he was afraid of not being 
allowed to re-enter the country as an Iranian citizen). For a ruling brought before the 
court by the challengers of the travel restriction, see International Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, No. TDC-17-0361, 2017 WL 818255 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2017) 
(granting a motion to proceed under pseudonyms).  
114. Laura Jarrett, Allie Malloy & Dan Merica, Trump Promises New 
Immigration Order as DOJ Holds Off Appeals Court, CNN (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/16/politics/donald-trump-travel-ban-executive-
order/. 
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States.  The pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit was voluntarily 
dismissed.115 
B. Executive Order 13,780 
In many ways, the new version of Protecting the Nation from 
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States was similar to its 
predecessor, Executive Order 13,769.116  Executive Order 13,780 
retained the fixed period entry ban for nationals of six predominantly 
Muslim countries: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, 
claiming their admission “would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States.”117  Additionally, the fixed period suspension of 
admitting refugees under the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
remained unhurt.118  The same is true for the reference to potential 
foreign troublemakers, such as honor killers.119 
However, this new travel restriction also contained important 
differences from the previous order.120  Iraq was removed from the list 
of countries affected by the travel restrictions,121 and the choice to keep 
the other countries on the list was explicitly justified.122  Additionally, 
the new order provided guidance for dealing with those nationals who 
                                                          
115. Nanda, supra note 36, at 318; see also Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 
1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from the majority’s opinion not to 
rehear the case en banc and saying “[even] if we have questions about the basis for 
the President’s ultimate findings—whether it was a “Muslim ban” or something 
else—we do not get to peek behind the curtain. So long as there is one “facially 
legitimate and bona fide” reason for the President’s actions, our inquiry is at an end”).  
116. See Barrow, supra note 65, at 692–94 (describing the similarities and 
differences between the two Executive Orders).   
117. Exec. Order 13,780, supra note 35, at 13213. 
118. Id. at 13215 (the case-by-case decision to admit some refugees in spite of 
the enacted travel restrictions also remained intact). 
119. Id. at 13217 (urging authorities to inform the President about “the number 
and types of acts of gender-based violence against women, including so-called ‘honor 
killings,’ in the United States by foreign nationals.”). 
120. See Barrow, supra note 65, at 693. 
121. Exec. Order 13,780, supra note 35, at 13212 (“[T]he close cooperative 
relationship between the United States and the democratically elected Iraqi 
government, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant 
presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq’s commitment to combat ISIS justify 
different treatment for Iraq.”). 
122. Id. at 13210–11. 
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had been affected by the travel restrictions but possessed valid travel 
documents.123 
More importantly, Executive Order 13,780 was Trump’s response 
to the litigation surrounding revoked Executive Order 13,769 in 
general,124 and in particular to the panel’s opinion denying the 
government’s motion to stay the TRO.125  Consequently, the new order 
gave the President room to waive aside allegations of a discriminatory 
rationale behind the former version. President Trump defended the 
revoked version, saying: 
Executive Order 13769 did not provide a basis for discriminating for 
or against members of any particular religion. While that order 
allowed for prioritization of refugee claims from members of 
persecuted religious minority groups, that priority applied to 
refugees from every nation, including those in which Islam is a 
minority religion, and it applied to minority sects within a religion. 
That order was not motivated by animus toward any religion, but was 
instead intended to protect the ability of religious minorities.126 
The President also showed serious disagreement with the Ninth 
Circuit’s denial of the motion to stay.  While the court agreed the 
executive branch is in a better position to make decisions concerning 
the admission policy, it—in spite of this important acknowledgement—
”declined to stay or narrow [the granted TRO] pending the outcome of 
further judicial proceedings.”127  However, the “better position” 
argument led the President to design a new travel ban,128 which 
                                                          
123. Id. at 13213–14 (for example, excepting green card holders; people with 
valid travel visas; and affected nationals with dual citizenship, so long as the travel 
documents are not issued by one of the affected countries). 
124. Id. at 13210 (speaking of a “delay” in the implementation of the travel 
restrictions due to litigation). 
125. Id. 
126. Id.  
127. Id.; Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017) (admitting 
the lack of authority “to . . . rewrite the Executive Order” since the executive branch 
is “far better equipped to make appropriate distinctions”). 
128. Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion 
Case to Korematsu to the Muslim Travel Ban Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1183, 
1189 (2018) (noting racial discrimination jurisprudence is “the strongest precedential 
authority for President Trump’s executive actions” to enact travel restrictions against 
Muslims). 
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“expressly exclude[d] from the suspensions categories of aliens that 
have prompted judicial concerns and which clarifie[d] or refine[d] the 
approach to certain other issues or categories of affected aliens.”129 
These new justifications, explanations, and exemptions did not 
guarantee the full enforcement of the new travel restrictions.  Rather, a 
new series of litigation began.130  And again, the challengers to 
President Trump won important victories in the courtroom.131  The first 
nationwide TRO blocking implementation of the new travel restrictions 
was issued on March 15, 2017.  In an opinion similar to Aziz, the district 
court of Hawaii enjoined authorities from enforcing Sections 2132 and 6 
of the new Executive order,133 one day before the new restrictions came 
into effect.134 
In issuing the injunction, the court discussed the allegations of 
Muslim discrimination behind the travel restrictions.  Unlike the 
decision in Louhghalam, which found the language in the Executive 
order neutral to religion,135 the district court of Hawaii concluded that: 
[because] a reasonable, objective observer—enlightened by the 
specific historical context, contemporaneous public statements, and 
specific sequence of events leading to its issuance—would conclude 
that the Executive Order was issued with a purpose to disfavor a 
particular religion, in spite of its stated, religiously neutral purpose, 
                                                          
129. Exec. Order 13,780, supra note 35, at 13212. 
130. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, No. 17-CV-112-WMC, 2017 WL 975996, at *1 
(W.D. Wis. Mar. 10, 2017) (granting a TRO in part and enjoining the authorities from 
enforcing Exec. Order 13,780 in relation to the plaintiff). 
131. See Nanda, supra note 36, at 318 (providing an overview of cases against 
the new order). 
132. With few exceptions, generally banning nationals of six predominately 
Muslim majority countries from entering the United States. See Hawaii v. Trump, 241 
F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1140 (D. Haw. 2017). 
133. Section 6 of the new Executive Order concerned the temporary suspension 
of admitting refugees to the United States. See id.  
134. See id.; see also Exec. Order 13,780, supra note 35, at 13218 (Hawaii v. 
Trump was decided on March 15, 2017, while Executive Order 13,780 had an 
effective date of March 16, 2017). 
135. Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2017). 
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the Court finds that [challengers] are likely to succeed on the merits 
of their Establishment Clause claim.136 
This conclusion informed how the court dealt with the Government’s 
claim that the enacted travel ban was designed to meet neutral security 
purposes. 
The Government argued that the ban did not target the Islamic faith 
or all Muslims around the globe, emphasizing the fact that the 
restriction was limited to a specified number of countries.  Addressing 
this argument, the court said: 
[this] illogic of the Government’s contentions is palpable. The notion 
that one can demonstrate animus toward any group of people only by 
targeting all of them at once is fundamentally flawed. The Court 
declines to relegate its Establishment Clause analysis to a purely 
mathematical exercise. . . . Equally flawed is the [argument] that the 
Executive Order cannot be found to have targeted Islam because it 
applies to all individuals in the six referenced countries. It is 
undisputed, using the primary source upon which the Government 
itself relies, that these six countries have overwhelmingly Muslim 
populations . . . It would therefore be no paradigmatic leap to 
conclude that targeting these countries likewise targets Islam. 
Certainly, it would be inappropriate to conclude, as the Government 
does, that it does not.137 
The court concluded that, by subjecting travelers from 
predominately Muslim nations to prohibitions, the new travel ban again 
singled out one specific religion for disfavored treatment.  This 
conclusion formed the legal underpinning of the court’s discussion of 
the alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.138  With reference to 
                                                          
136. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1134 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting 
nationwide TRO). 
137. Id. at 1135. 
138. Id. at 1134. The Court used similar reasoning to note the main purpose of 
the travel restriction was to single out Muslims for a special prohibition. See id. at 
1137 (noting any “reasonable, objective observer would conclude . . . that the stated 
secular purpose of the Executive Order is, at the very least, ‘secondary to a religious 
objective’ of temporarily suspending the entry of Muslims” (citation omitted)). For 
criticism of the court’s reasoning, see Elbert Lin, States Suing the Federal 
Government: Protecting Liberty or Playing Politics?, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 633, 644 
(2018).  
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the political context in which the travel bans were issued, the court 
found that challengers had rightly stated a violation of non-
Establishment.  According to the court, the political context 
surrounding the travel restrictions clearly illustrated the true motivation 
behind the bans: “religious animus.”139  The “unrebutted evidence” of 
this animus explained why the authorities had urged the court to focus 
on the plain text of the order, rather than the broader political context.140  
In the days after Hawaii, courts across the country granted temporary 
injunctions on similar grounds,141 blocking and freezing enforcement 
of the enacted travel restrictions.142  The administration’s response to 
                                                          
139. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1136 (D. Haw. 2017). 
140. Id. (“[T]he historical background [of the travel restrictions] makes plain 
why the Government wishes to focus on the Executive Order’s text, rather than its 
context. The record before this Court is unique. It includes significant and unrebutted 
evidence of religious animus driving the promulgation of the Executive Order and its 
related predecessor.”). 
141. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 
566 (D. Md. 2017) (granting nationwide preliminary injunction blocking enforcement 
of § 2(c) Exec. Order 13,780, restricting the entry opportunities of nationals of six 
predominantly Muslim majority countries), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 
554 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2017), and 
vacated and remanded sub nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353, 
199 L. Ed. 2d 203 (2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1239 (D. Haw. 
2017) (granting nationwide preliminary injunction), hearing in banc denied sub nom. 
Hawaii v. Trump, 864 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2017), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
remanded sub nom. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub 
nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L. Ed. 2d 643 
(2017), and vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377, 199 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2017), and 
appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Hawaii v. Trump, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017); 
Hamama v. Adducci, No. 17-CV-11910, 2017 WL 2684477, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 
22, 2017) (granting TRO to stay the execution of removal); State v. Trump, 263 F. 
Supp. 3d 1049, 1062–63 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (granting 
nationwide injunction against enforcement of travel restrictions—§§ 2(c), 6(a), and 
6(b) Exec. Order 13,780—affecting close relatives, like grandparents, of people living 
in the United States). 
142. Contra Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 719, 737–38 (E.D. Va. 2017) 
(denying TRO that would enjoin authorities from enforcing the new travel restrictions, 
holding that Executive Order is unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, and furthermore holding that the challengers were not to succeed under the 
guarantees of the Establishment Clause: “the substantive revisions reflected in [the 
new Executive Order] have reduced the probative value of the President’s statements 
to the point that it is no longer likely that Plaintiffs can succeed on their claim that the 
predominate purpose of [the new Executive Order] is to discriminate against Muslims 
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these judicial developments was twofold.  Put differently, the 
administration played—like chess masters—on two boards at the same 
time.  First, the President used public debate to lash out at judges who 
had voted against his travel restrictions, accusing them of endangering 
the country and writing political judgments to aggrandize their own 
power and influence.143  Simultaneously, his team of lawyers and legal 
advisors worked on a strategy to convince judges that the President had 
the sole legal authority to make decisions regarding the admission of 
aliens.144  This double-faceted strategy is characteristic of the Trump 
administration’s dealings with political disappointments, at least in the 
area of regulating immigration.145 
However, these strategies did not immediately turn out to be the 
legal game-changer the President had hoped they would be.  Instead, 
history repeated itself.  The nationwide injunctions—blocking 
enforcement of key parts of the new travel suspension and restriction 
regime—were largely upheld by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.146  Both 
courts shared an important concern: the waning influence of the rule of 
                                                          
based on their religion and that [the new Executive Order] is a pretext or a sham for 
that purpose.”). 
143. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Twitter and the #So-CalledJudge, 71 S.M.U. L. 
REV. 249, 265–68 (2018) (discussing how Trump has repeatedly attacked the judiciary 
after a disappointing judgment and arguing that judges should use social media to 
reach a broader audience); see also Alison Higgins Merrill, Nicholas D. Conway & 
Joseph Daniel Ura, Confidence and Constraint: Public Opinion, Judicial 
Independence, and the Roberts Court, 54 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 209, 223 (2017) 
(pointing out that judges have little means to save their institution from political 
attacks). 
144. Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 
71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 501 (2018) (providing an overview of statements made by 
President Trump to show his disagreement with the legal decisions issued against his 
travel restrictions, also pointing to the Administration’s willingness to respect the 
legal decisions and follow the appropriate appellate procedures).  
145. Cf. Chacón, supra note 51, at 257. 
146. International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 601 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (holding, among others, that challengers were “likely to succeed on the 
merits of their Establishment Clause claim.”); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 761 
(9th Cir. 2017) (holding, per curiam, among others, that challengers had “shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits of [their INA-based statutory claim] and that the 
district court’s preliminary injunction order can be affirmed in large part based on 
statutory grounds[,]” but not addressing the challengers’ Establishment Clause 
claims). 
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law, which shaped a dangerous precedent for fact-free engagement in 
politics.147 
Nevertheless, in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance 
Project, President Trump gained an important victory on his way to 
establishing his desired travel regime.148  Equipped with this safeguard, 
the President issued a new travel ban: Proclamation 9645, titled 
Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted 
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety 
Threats.149  The President announced this new ban in September 2017, 
just ninety days after receiving a partial stay of the issued injunctions. 
C. Proclamation 9645 
Like its predecessors, the new travel ban singled out nationals of 
certain states for special travel restrictions.  However, this ban was also 
unique in some respects.  Remarkably, the Proclamation did not contain 
the stereotypes explicitly mentioned by its predecessors, namely, honor 
killers and women abusers.  Instead, the general focus was on protecting 
the country from terrorism.150 
                                                          
147. Renan, supra note 73, at 2259–60. See also Matthew R. Segal, America’s 
Conscience: The Rise of Civil Society Groups Under President Trump, 65 UCLA L. 
REV. 1574, 1579 (2018) (expecting that authorities will lose credibility because of 
President Trump’s animus toward everything he dislikes and positing that if “the 
federal government is . . . going to behave just like a landlord who won’t rent to Black 
people, then it will command precisely the same level of respect.”).  
148. Cf. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2090, 198 
L. Ed. 2d 643 (2017) (Thomas, J., with whom Alito, J., and Gorsuch J., join concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“I agree with the Court’s implicit conclusion that the 
Government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits—that 
is, that the judgments below will be reversed. The Government has also established 
that failure to stay the injunctions will cause irreparable harm.”). 
149. Proclamation 9645, supra note 35.  
150. Id. (defending the need for this Proclamation as follows: “As President, I 
must act to protect the security and interests of the United States and its people. I am 
committed to our ongoing efforts to engage those countries willing to cooperate, 
improve information-sharing and identity-management protocols and procedures, and 
address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks. . . . I have determined, on the 
basis of recommendations from the Secretary of Homeland Security and other 
members of my Cabinet, to impose certain conditional restrictions and limitations . . . 
on entry into the United States of nationals of the countries identified in section 2 of 
this proclamation.”)  
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Another important distinction between this Proclamation and its 
predecessors concerns the durability of the latter.  While the previous 
versions were designed to temporarily suspend the entry of certain 
nationals, the Proclamation had an indefinite character “to advance the 
national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the 
United States.”151  The only escape was through a recommendation to 
the President to change the policies, following the outcomes of a review 
every 180 days.152  But more importantly, for the first time in the history 
of President Trump’s travel restrictions, the Proclamation included 
“non-Muslim” countries.  This new ban added North Korea153 and 
Venezuela to the list of countries affected by the travel restrictions.154  
Other states on this list included Iran,155 Libya,156 Somalia,157 Syria,158 
Yemen,159 and Chad, which was removed from this list in April 
2018.160  Despite this most recent version of the travel ban including 
                                                          
151. Id. § 8 (also urging authorities to enforce the restrictions “to the maximum 
extent possible”). 
152. Id. § 4 (urging authorities to report “within 180 days, . . . and every 180 
days thereafter” about the need to uphold the restrictions and if necessary to modify 
them).  
153. Id. § 2(d)(ii) (suspending all nonimmigrant and immigrant visas).  
154. Id. § 2(f)(ii) (suspending “entry into the United States of officials of 
government agencies of Venezuela involved in screening and vetting procedures . . . 
and their immediate family members, as nonimmigrants on business (B-1), tourist (B-
2), and business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visas”). Officials “traveling on a diplomatic or 
diplomatic-type visa” were excepted from this provision. See id. § 3(b)(v). 
155. Id. § 2(b)(ii) (suspending all immigrant visas and all nonimmigrant visas, 
except F, M, and J visas, instead subjecting those particular visa holders to enhanced 
screening procedures). 
156. Id. § 2(c)(ii) (suspending nonimmigrant B-1, B-2 and B-1/B-2 visas, and 
suspending all immigrant visas). 
157. Id. § 2(h)(ii) (suspending all immigrant visas, and putting nonimmigrant 
visa applicants under “additional scrutiny to determine if [they] are connected to 
terrorist organizations or otherwise pose a threat to the national security or public 
safety.”). 
158. Id. § 2(e)(ii) (suspending all nonimmigrant and immigrant visas). 
159. Id. § 2(g)(ii) (suspending nonimmigrant B-1, B-2 and B-1/B-2 visas, and 
suspending all immigrant visas). 
160. Proclamation No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (Apr. 13, 2018) (titled 
Maintaining Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted 
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats) (“[T]he 
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some “non-Muslim” states and removing one Muslim majority country, 
Sudan, the vast majority of the targeted states still consisted of places 
with predominantly Muslim populations.161  Furthermore, the addition 
of Venezuela had a primarily symbolic significance, since most of its 
nationals were not affected by the suspension.162  Therefore, North 
Korea was the only “non-Muslim” state that faced the same travel 
restrictions as other predominantly-Muslim countries on the list.163 
The issuance of this new and indefinite travel ban has had two 
important short-term effects.  First, because Executive Order 13,780 
expired on the date President Trump issued Proclamation 9645, the 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the cases it had previously 
granted certiorari to hear.  The Court instructed the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits to dismiss as moot those cases challenging the legality of the 
travel restrictions.164  Second, a new wave of legal challenges blocked 
enforcement of the travel restrictions.  Again, the likelihood of success 
in challenging the travel restrictions regime on grounds that it 
discriminates and violates the Establishment Clause played an 
important role in courts granting nationwide injunctions.165 
                                                          
entry into the United States of the nationals of Chad . . . no longer would be 
detrimental to the interests of the United States . . . .”). 
161. See Proclamation 9645, supra note 35, § 3 (listing exceptions and waivers 
to be decided on a case-by-case basis).  
162. See id. § 2(f)(ii). 
163. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 623 
(D. Md. 2017) (“[T]he inclusion of two non-majority Muslim nations, North Korea 
and Venezuela, does not persuasively show a lack of religious purpose behind the 
Proclamation. The Venezuela ban is qualitatively different from the others because it 
extends only to government officials, and the ban on North Korea [affects] fewer than 
100 people . . . In short, the inclusion of Venezuela and North Korea in the 
Proclamation has little practical consequence.”).  
164. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353, L. Ed. 2d 203 
(2017) (mem.); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377, 199 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2017) (mem.). 
See also W. Neil Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, The Trump Administration and the 
Breakdown of Intra-Executive Legal Process, 127 YALE L.J. F. 825, 831 (2018); Peter 
Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial Review of Immigration Law in 
the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2018) (both providing a 
brief timeline of the legal developments related to the travel restrictions). 
165. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 
(D. Md. 2017), aff’d, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018), as amended, (Feb. 28, 2018), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018), and cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018); State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw. 
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After thoroughly analyzing the history and political context of the 
imposed travel restrictions, the method adopted to select the countries 
to be put under security scrutiny, and the language used to define the 
restrictions, Judge Theodore Chuang stated: 
there are substantial reasons to question whether the asserted national 
security purpose has now indeed become the primary purpose. First, 
the underlying architecture of the prior Executive Orders and the 
Proclamation is fundamentally the same. Each of these executive 
actions bans the issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas on 
the basis of nationality to multiple majority-Muslim countries on the 
basis of concerns about terrorism. The Proclamation does not 
abandon this fundamental approach, but rather doubles down on 
it166 . . . . [Hence,] the Court concludes that where the Proclamation 
itself is not sufficiently independent of [its predecessors] to signal a 
purposeful, persuasive change in the primary purpose of the travel 
ban, and there were no other public signs that ‘‘as persuasively’’ as 
the original violation established a different primary purpose for the 
travel ban, it cannot find that a ‘‘reasonable observer’’ would 
understand that the primary purpose of the Proclamation’s travel ban 
is no longer the desire to impose a Muslim ban.167 
The sharpest judicial condemnation of Trump’s travel ban as a sign 
of animosity toward Muslims and Islam followed a few months later.  
In International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the nationwide injunction was warranted only in 
relation to “foreign nationals with a bona fide relationship with an 
individual or entity in the United States.”168  However, after a thorough 
examination of “official statements from President Trump and other 
                                                          
2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted 138 
S. Ct. 923 (2018), and rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
166. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 624 (D. 
Md. 2017). Cf. State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1157 (D. Haw. 2017) (critical 
of the methodological justification behind the selection of the targeted countries, 
concluding that “[the Proclamation’s] individualized country findings make no effort 
to explain why some types of visitors from a particular country are banned, while 
others are not”).  
167. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 624, 628 
(referring to McCreary C. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 872 (2005)). 
168. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 271 (4th Cir. 
2018). 
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executive branch officials, along with the Proclamation itself,” the court 
concluded that the ban was “unconstitutionally tainted with animus 
toward Islam.”169 
This sharp conclusion about religious animosity—“evidenced by 
official statements of the President . . . that graphically disparage the 
Islamic faith and its practitioners”170—came at a time when President 
Trump was celebrating his most significant progress in dealing with the 
legal challenges that had continuously delayed what he had promised 
to his voters: enacting a travel ban.  In December 2017, the Supreme 
Court ordered to stay the granted preliminary injunctions pending 
“disposition of the Government’s appeal . . . and disposition of the 
Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari.”171  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court urged the courts of appeal to reach their decisions “with 
appropriate dispatch.”172  In light of this order, the circuit courts decided 
to stay their decisions pending the Supreme Court’s future decisions.173 
This order did not issue any limitations on the scope of the travel 
restrictions,174 and the Trump administration approached it as “a 
substantial victory for the safety and security of the American 
people.”175  This timely victory advanced the President’s immigration 
                                                          
169. Id. at 256–57. 
170. Id. at 353 (Harris, Cir. J., with whom Gribbon Motz, Cir. J., and King, Cir. 
J., join, concurring).  
171. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.); 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.). 
172. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.); 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.).  
173. See Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 702 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 274 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Lauri Kai, 
Embracing the Chinese Exclusion Case: An International Law Approach to Racial 
Exclusions, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2617, 2621–22 (2018) (suggesting that 
contemporary travel restrictions survive Supreme Court review because the “plenary 
power doctrine” has made policies related to immigration and admission 
“nonjusticiable.”).  
174. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 
(2017) (granting certioraris limited the scope of the enforcement to those who failed 
to prove their bona fide relationship); but see Jeremy Martin, Trump v. International 
Refugee Assistance Program 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), 44 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 131, 142 
(2018) (critical of this formula). 
175. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban to Take Effect, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trump-
travel-ban-supreme-Court.html (quoting Attorney General Jeff Sessions). 
38
California Western Law Review, Vol. 56 [], No. 1, Art. 15
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/15
Wahedi camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 1/30/2020  10:25 AM 
2019] MUSLIMS AND THE MYTHS  173 
agenda,176 and the administration began to enforce the travel 
restrictions soon after the issuance of the stays.177  Moreover, the 
authorities continued to uphold the travel restrictions after the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in January 2018.178  Consequently, the stay 
order remained in effect pending the Supreme Court’s final decision.179  
This decision came in June 2018, when the Supreme Court upheld 
Proclamation 9645 in Trump v. Hawaii.180 
The Court’s opinion in this case was extraordinary,181 and not 
merely because of the animus toward one particular religion that 
surrounded the case,182 prompting today’s travel ban controversy to be 
mentioned in the same breath as cases of racial exclusion from the dark 
decades behind us.183  No, Trump v. Hawaii is special because the 
Supreme Court missed an opportunity to explain to its critics why the 
                                                          
176. See Josh Blackman, The Travel Bans, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 30 
(2017–2018) (arguing the stay order “was a conclusive indication that the lower courts 
had gone astray”). Cf. Ratna Kapur, The Ayodhya Case: Hindu Majoritarianism and 
the Right to Religious Liberty, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 305, 311 (2014) (pointing out how 
landmark decisions can advance political agendas). 
177. See December 4, 2017 – Court Order on Presidential Proclamation, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-
resources/presidential-proclamation-archive/2017-12-04-Presidential-
Proclamation.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).   
178. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923, 924, 199 L. Ed. 2d 620 (2018); see also 
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542, 542 (2018) (mem.). 
179. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.); 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.). 
180. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).  
181. Cf. Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break 
Down, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1453–54 (2018) (asserting the negative assessment 
the travel ban has received fits a broader tendency, in which other branches of power 
show their serious disagreement with President Trump’s violation of important 
(unwritten) norms). 
182. See Emily C. Callan, A Funny Thing Happened on My Way to the 
Border . . . How the Recent Immigration Executive Orders and Subsequent Lawsuits 
Demonstrate the Immediate Need for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 47 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 1, 11 (2017) (writing that this case “entered a new realm of 
jurisprudence” by considering statements made by President Trump on the campaign 
trail). 
183. Cf. Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable Executive: National Security and 
the Limits of Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. 731, 753 (2017); David S. Rubenstein 
& Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 
594–95 (2017). 
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travel ban case was so different from other recent controversies 
concerning religious discrimination and religious neutrality, such as the 
Masterpiece Cakeshop case.184 
Before discussing this point of criticism further, we must first 
explore the arguments set forth in Trump v. Hawaii denying the 
unconstitutionality of the most recent travel ban.  We will then turn to 
a criticism of double standards, analyzing how the Court has responded 
differently to those officials’ statements showing hostility toward 
religion.  Finally, we will briefly highlight the argument that authorities 
should always be mindful of the constitutional tradition, the freedoms 
guaranteed, and the impact their actions might have on society, as 
powerfully advocated by concurring Justice Kennedy.185 
1. Trump v. Hawaii 
On June 26, 2018, Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority 
opinion ruling on the lawfulness of President Trump’s latest travel 
ban.186  Although the Court dispatched this case barely two months after 
hearing oral arguments, the 5-4 vote was a clear indication of the 
Court’s contrasting views.  The highly divided Supreme Court upheld 
Proclamation 9645 on the grounds that: (1) the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) allows the President to deny entry to aliens 
when their admission would harm the interests of the United States;187 
(2) the non-discrimination provision of the INA relating to the issuance 
of visas does not alter the right of the President to deny aliens entry to 
                                                          
184. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Com’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2018). See Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 135–36 (2018) (blaming the Supreme Court for not providing 
sufficient standards for handling cases concerning religious discrimination and 
criticizing the Court for delivering contradictory opinions in Masterpiece and Trump 
v. Hawaii, both touching upon animosity toward religion and discrimination); 
Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 
1471, 1516 (2018) (“Perhaps Justice Sotomayor is correct that the majority in Trump 
v. Hawaii could not defend the presidential expressions of animus, so instead ignored 
that aspect of the analysis and ruled based on deference to the executive branch on 
issues of immigration and national security.”). 
185. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423–24 (2018) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
186. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
187. Id. at 2408–10 (referencing Immigration and Nationality Act § 1182(f)).  
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the United States;188 (3) the travel ban might be rationally related to its 
purported goal, namely national security;189 and (4) the ban did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.190  For purposes of this article, we 
will limit our analysis to the Court’s discussion of the travel ban’s 
constitutionality in light of the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause. 
The Supreme Court began this discussion by outlining the factors 
it would consider in assessing the lawfulness of the travel ban.  First, 
the Court clarified that its task was not to denounce what the President 
had said, but rather to protect the authority of the Presidency and the 
legitimacy of the Executive power.  Thus, what the President has said 
needs to be assessed in light of what exercising his Executive power 
entails.  That was the main focus of the Court, since the travel 
restrictions addressed “a matter [that fell] within the core of executive 
responsibility.”191  The Court further stated that this case is 
fundamentally different than other non-Establishment guarantee 
litigation because the issued Proclamation touched upon issues of 
national security, drawing on entirely religion-neutral language.192  
“Conventional” Establishment Clause cases, however, typically discuss 
the lawfulness of authorities’ endorsing religion in public.193 
With this background in mind, the Court reiterated that matters of 
admission and removal of aliens fall under the authority of the executive 
and legislative branches, insulating this specific issue from judicial 
scrutiny.194  The Court explained that those branches are better 
informed to make such decisions because “decisions in these matters 
may implicate ‘relations with foreign powers,’ or involve 
‘classifications defined in the light of changing political and economic 
circumstances.’”195  However, when admission questions implicate the 
constitutional rights of United States citizens, it may provide reason for 
                                                          
188. Id. at 2414–15. 
189. Id. at 2423. 
190. Id. at 2420. 
191. Id. at 2418. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. (noting “typical” Establishment Clause cases involve religious displays 
or school prayer).  
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 2418–19 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)). 
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the Court to put such cases under scrutiny.196  Yet this does not alter the 
legal authority given to the executive and legislative branches to make 
decisions concerning the admission of aliens.  In other words, those 
branches retain the final say.  That is also the case “when the Executive 
exercises this [delegated] power negatively on the basis of a facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason, the Courts will neither look behind the 
exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification,” in 
light of the Constitutional rights of United States citizens.197 
Further, the Court approaches cases of national security with the 
highest possible cautiousness, given the authority and information the 
President has regarding such cases.  The majority noted that applying 
the conventional inquiry—that is, asking whether the adopted policy 
was facially legitimate and bona fide—“would put an end to our 
review.”198  However, following the suggestion of the Government, the 
Court delved beyond the ban’s facially neutral appearance.199  In this 
respect, the Court drew upon its rational basis doctrine to assess the 
lawfulness of the travel ban in light of the Establishment Clause.  The 
Court “may consider . . . extrinsic evidence [as submitted by the 
challengers to the travel restrictions], but will uphold the policy so long 
as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification 
independent of unconstitutional grounds.”200 
In other words, the rational basis doctrine does not help opponents 
of the travel restrictions to halt a policy that pursues a legitimate 
government interest.  To illustrate this point, the majority referred to “a 
few occasions” where the Court has invalidated policies that were 
clearly harmful.201  In Romer v. Evans, for instance, the Supreme Court 
struck down a state amendment that clearly discriminated against non-
heterosexuals, depriving them of the right to access anti-discrimination 
                                                          
196. Id. at 2419 (“[A]lthough foreign nationals seeking admission have no 
constitutional right to entry, this Court has engaged in a circumscribed judicial inquiry 
when the denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen.”) 
(quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756–57 (1972)). 
197. Id. at 2419. 
198. Id. at 2420. 
199. Id. 
200. Id.; see also Sorkin, supra note 80 (discussing “extrinsic evidence”). 
201. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (noting the Court has 
invalidated policies that appear to have been implemented for no other purpose than 
a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” (citation omitted)).  
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laws.202  The Court’s limited precedent in striking down laws and 
policies that do not pursue a legitimate governmental interest provided 
little guidance here.  However, the Court concluded that the travel ban 
regime did not share such characteristics with cases like Romer to 
warrant invalidating the Proclamation.203  Chief Justice Roberts stated: 
[the] Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate purposes: 
preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and 
inducing other nations to improve their practices. The text says 
nothing about religion. [Challengers to the Proclamation] 
nonetheless emphasize that five of the seven nations currently 
included in the Proclamation have Muslim-majority populations. Yet 
that fact alone does not support an inference of religious hostility, 
given that the policy covers just 8% of the world’s Muslim 
population and is limited to countries that were previously 
designated by Congress or prior administrations as posing national 
security risks.204 
The Supreme Court also saw no reason to invalidate the 
Proclamation on the ground that it lacked effectiveness, as posited by 
the challengers.  The Court could not properly evaluate the content of 
that argument, since the effectiveness question involved complicated 
matters that were better suited for the executive branch.  Put differently, 
the Court was not in a position to “substitute [its] own assessment for 
the Executive’s predictive judgments on [security] matters.”205  The 
fact that the Government had removed three predominantly-Muslim 
countries from the list of affected countries further reaffirmed the view 
that the Proclamation pursued a legitimate security interest.206  
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the Proclamation included 
“significant exceptions” and waiver programs for those nationals 
affected by the restrictions.207 
Despite the majority noting the Court would not denounce any 
political statements made by the President in the context of the travel 
                                                          
202. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996). 
203. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–21 (2018). 
204. Id. at 2421. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 2422. 
207. Id.  
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bans, it nevertheless bitterly denounced any comparison between the 
contemporary travel bans and the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Korematsu v. United States concerning the lawfulness of forced 
relocations based on race and national origin.  Opponents of the travel 
bans had suggested that the restrictions rested on the same narrative 
present in Korematsu—namely, anxiety toward a specific group of 
people that ultimately resulted in singling them out for a cruel relocation 
policy.208  The majority vigorously denounced this comparison, saying: 
Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation 
of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the 
basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of 
Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally 
repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign 
nationals the privilege of admission. . . . The entry suspension is an 
act that is well within executive authority and could have been taken 
by any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions 
of this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid 
Proclamation.209 
The majority went a step further in conveying its disdain toward 
Korematsu, stating the decision “was gravely wrong the day it was 
decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—
‘has no place in law under the Constitution.’”210 
The Court concluded that the Government had met its burden to 
demonstrate the Proclamation pursued a legitimate government 
interest—security protection—which is itself a rational and justified 
ground to limit the entry of certain nationals.  Finding that the 
Proclamation survived rational basis review, the Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court’s judgment granting the preliminary 
injunction.211 
                                                          
208. Id. at 2423. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944).  
209. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. 
210. Id. (quoting Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Korematsu). 
211. Id. 
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2. The Façade of Security Concerns and Double Standards 
While Trump v. Hawaii reaffirmed the Government’s argument 
that the Proclamation pursued a legitimate aim, one major criticism of 
the travel ban is that it is politically motivated and fulfills President 
Trump’s promise to implement a Muslim ban, instead of actually 
dealing with national security concerns.212  Critics maintain the travel 
ban lacks a bona fide justification, arguing that it instead rests primarily 
on stereotypes about immigrants.213  However, stereotyping 
immigrants—varying from job-hunters to terrorists—has proven to be 
a successful method for justifying exclusionary politics today and in the 
past.214 
Another criticism of the travel ban case is that the Supreme Court’s 
majority opinion applied double standards.  It was uncritical toward the 
President’s remarks about Muslims both during the election and after 
he took office, but critical toward officials’ statements discrediting 
majoritarian religious sensitivities.  For example, the Court considered 
the President’s statements toward Muslims irrelevant for purposes of 
assessing the travel ban, but the “hostile” religious statements of a local 
civil rights commissioner were found decisive for the Court’s 
assessment of a First Amendment claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop.215 
                                                          
212. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 63, at 1502–06. The “disconnect” between a 
neutral defense of the ban (security concerns) and its political presentation (a Muslim 
ban) puzzled courts in how to approach the travel bans. See Katherine Shaw, Beyond 
the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71, 124 (2017). 
213. Cf. Leti Volpp, Protecting the Nation from “Honor Killings”: The 
Construction of a Problem, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 133, 169 (2019) (arguing that 
“[the] specter of violence against women has played an important role in the Trump 
administration’s executive orders seeking to bar Muslims from entry, and continues 
to rationalize the notion that the nation must be protected through their exclusion. Yet 
this submerged story has been largely overlooked.”). 
214. Critics have placed the contemporary travel bans in the category of 
exclusionary policies that have historically singled out specific groups of immigrants 
for special bans. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 128; Kai, supra note 173; Michael 
Kagan, Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law? (The President Is Trying to 
Find Out), 1 NEV. L.J. F. 80 (2017). 
215. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1731 (2018); see also Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 
515–16 (2018) (criticizing the Court for being overtly protective toward majoritarian 
beliefs and sensitives, while indifferent toward similar claims for protection coming 
from minority groups); Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for 
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These two major points of criticism—the façade of security 
concerns behind the travel ban and the presence of double standards—
are further discussed in light of Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion 
in Trump v. Hawaii, which dispatches each of these concerns 
thoroughly.  Justice Sotomayor stated that “repackaging” the promise 
of enacting a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the 
United States” as a matter of national security “does little to cleanse 
Presidential Proclamation No. 9645 of the appearance of discrimination 
that the President’s words have created.”216 
Justice Sotomayor further suggested that “behind [the] facade of 
national security concerns” existed fear of the stranger in general and 
of the Muslim migrant in particular.217  This is reflected in the obvious 
presence of animus toward Muslims that drove the President to issue 
travel bans singling out Muslims in the first place.  This hostile 
language toward Muslims has always surrounded the travel bans and 
plainly contradicts the guarantee of neutrality toward religion enshrined 
in the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  Furthermore, a 
historical review of the emergence of travel bans in the Trump era 
complicates the argument that the travel bans were not issued to target 
Muslims.  It was therefore regrettable, according to Justice Sotomayor, 
that the majority limited its review to the plain text of the 
Proclamation.218 
To properly evaluate the challengers’ Establishment Clause claim, 
it is necessary, according to Justice Sotomayor, to review the statements 
of the President as a whole.  It is this “full record [of statements that] 
paints a far more harrowing picture [than the one we may discern on the 
basis of the majority judgment], from which a reasonable observer 
would readily conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by 
hostility and animus toward the Muslim faith”219 instead of pressing 
                                                          
Religious Objectors, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 168 (2017–2018) (saying that in 
general “majoritarian branches are insensitive to particular free-exercise claims” and 
urging the Court to mind this unfortunate circumstance in its decisions). See generally 
Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility: What is Hostile to 
Religion Under the Establishment Clause?, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2004).   
216. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 2435. 
219. Id. 
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security needs.220  This is exacerbated, according to Justice Sotomayor, 
by the fact that President Trump has never rectified his bold statements, 
despite his many opportunities to do so.221  Instead of offering a 
different justification for the relationship between the travel restrictions 
and the Muslim faith, to make the national security claim more 
plausible to the objective observer, the President has continued his 
infamous attacks on the Muslim community.222 
Referencing the majority decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop—
decided just weeks before Trump v. Hawaii—Justice Sotomayor called 
it striking that the Court found “less pervasive official expressions of 
hostility and the failure to disavow them to be Constitutionally 
significant.”223  Why the Court chose not to draw the same line in the 
travel ban case was “perplexing.”224  This difference in treatment leaves 
an unsatisfactory feeling.  While local officials were held “accountable” 
for the impact of their statements about religion in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, the majority declined to apply the same standard in this 
case.225  But, as Justice Sotomayor indicated, both cases questioned 
“whether a government actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality in 
reaching a decision that affects individuals’ fundamental religious 
freedom.”226 
The majority’s choice to exclude the President’s statements from 
its legal assessment—while operating opposite to Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, a case concerning majoritarian sensitives227—is a disservice 
to adherents of minority religions.  Justice Sotomayor concluded that 
                                                          
220. Id. at 2438. 
221. Id. at 2439. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 2441 (however, Justice Sotomayor uses the term “perplexing” to 
criticize the choice of the majority to apply rational basis doctrine in assessing the 
lawfulness of the Proclamation. This is a “perplexing” choice because the Court has 
historically applied “a more stringent” test in Establishment Clause cases, especially 
ones about animosity toward religion. This major difference in deciding similar cases 
justifies our choice to quote “perplexing.”). 
225. Id. at 2447. 
226. Id. 
227. Cf. Nora Olabi, “We Told You So”: Conservatives Use Masterpiece 
Decision to Energize Base, WESTWORD (Jun. 5, 2018), 
https://www.westword.com/news/colorado-republicans-use-masterpiece-cakeshop-
Court-decision-to-rally-support-for-november-elections-10377635. 
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applying double standards in apparently similar cases “erodes the 
foundational principles of religious tolerance that the Court elsewhere 
has so emphatically protected, and it tells members of minority 
religions in our country” that they are not equally entitled to the same 
rights and privileges as those who belong to the majority.228 
3. The Freedom to Disregard the Constitutional Tradition 
Justice Sotomayor’s criticism of the Court’s decision in Trump v. 
Hawaii primarily concerned President Trump’s remarks, his decision 
not to rectify those remarks, and his continued hostility toward 
members of the Islamic minority in the United States.  While the 
majority excluded President Trump’s remarks from their analysis, 
concurring Justice Kennedy noted that public statements made by the 
executive branch may have significant societal consequences.229  
Justice Kennedy cautioned that although such statements are often “not 
subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention,” this does not allow 
government officials “to disregard the Constitution and the rights it 
proclaims and protects.”230  Officials have broad discretion free from 
judicial scrutiny, but it is this freedom that “makes it all the more 
imperative for [government officials] to adhere to the Constitution and 
to its meaning and its promise.”231 
Justice Kennedy applied this concept of public manners to First 
Amendment controversies.  Because the Constitution guarantees the 
freedoms of religion and expression and simultaneously prohibits the 
Government from establishing any religion, 
[it is] an urgent necessity that officials adhere to these Constitutional 
guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of 
foreign affairs. An anxious world must know that our Government 
                                                          
228. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433, 2447 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
229. Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 2423–24 (also positing that the shared point of view in Trump v. 
Hawaii is that officials’ statements can be subjected to judicial scrutiny when such 
statements spread hostility toward, for example, religion, but that the scope of putting 
authorities’ statements under judicial scrutiny is quite limited and reserved to 
extraordinary circumstances). 
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remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to 
preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and lasts.232 
In a forceful plea, Justice Kennedy urged authorities to be mindful of 
the constitutional tradition, the freedoms and constraints guaranteed, 
and the impact their actions might have, both internally and externally.  
The public appearance of authorities should attest to the rich 
constitutional tradition of freedom and neutrality.233 
While Justice Kennedy did not apply his framework of public 
manners explicitly to the travel ban case, and specifically to President 
Trump’s remarks about Muslims, his unambiguous message of minding 
the Constitution while exercising power raises the following questions: 
how should we appraise President Trump’s travel ban project?  What 
does President Trump’s rhetorical attack on Muslims tell us?  Does the 
President’s disregard for the Constitution, in terms of explicitly 
questioning the reliability of one group of people, namely Muslims,234 
indicate that the United States has entered into a completely new era of 
hatred and racial discrimination?235 
The President has almost unlimited discretionary authority, and 
thus power, to deny aliens entry into the United States.236  This is what 
Trump v. Hawaii tells us.  And although it might be empirically right 
for the President to possess unlimited power to decide questions of 
admission, we must ask whether it is justified for the President to 
exclude categories of people.  We must ask whether the President 
should be allowed to continue—unrestrained—to insult adherents of 
one religion, portraying them, for example, as a dangerous group,237 
who are unreliable, ill-mannered, uncivilized, honor killers, rapists, 
                                                          
232. Id. at 2424. 
233. Id.  
234. Id. at 2437–42 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing at length the record 
of anti-Muslim statements made by President Trump). 
235. Cf. Eric K. Yamamoto, Maria Amparo Vanaclocha Berti & Jaime Tokioka, 
“Loaded Weapon” Revisited: The Trump Era Import of Justice Jackson’s Warning in 
Korematsu, 24 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 6 (2017) (noting the “[Trump] era is tarnished by 
accelerating Muslim harassment and discrimination”). 
236. See generally Barrow, supra note 65. 
237. Cf. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433–47 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (providing 
an overview of President Trump’s anti-Muslim statements, both during his 
presidential campaign and after assuming office). 
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ticking time bombs, and harmful to American society.238  It is the desire 
to exclude this group of individuals that has ultimately driven the 
President to enact a series of travel bans.239 
II. SAVE OUR STATE FROM ISLAM 
A historical analysis of President Trump’s travel ban project 
suggests his focus on border protection was mainly concerned with who 
is entering the country—drawing on stereotypes and ultimately 
ordering a series of facially neutral travel restrictions targeting one 
specific group of people.  However, concerns about who is living in the 
United States have similarly disfavored the American Muslim 
community.  For example, headscarves and beards kept for religious 
purposes have, for some, caused trouble in the workplace.240  Similar 
troubles arise in relation to plans to build mosques or Islamic centers.  
One particularly controversial example of this is the plan to build a 
multi-faith center close to Ground Zero in New York, popularly known 
as the “Ground Zero Mosque” by opponents of the project.241  Another 
consequence of the stereotypes surrounding the Muslim immigrant 
                                                          
238. Cf. Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and 
Framework, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 108, 111 (2016) (arguing that stereotypes 
are a driving factor behind policies that specifically target Muslims). 
239. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never 
White: At the Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 455, 481 (2017) (describing the enacted travel restrictions as “Trump’s attempt 
to fulfill his campaign promise to bar Muslims from entering the country”). 
240. See, e.g., Kelly A. Harrison, Hiding Under the Veil of “Dress Policy”: 
Muslim Women, Hijab, and Employment Discrimination in the United States, 17 GEO. 
J. GENDER & L. 831 (2016); Cheryl A. Sharp, Sweet Land of Liberty: Islamophobia 
and the Treatment of Muslims in the State of Connecticut, 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 
221 (2012); Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033 
(2009) (all referring to controversies at work because of a religious appearance).   
241. Cf. Nicholas A. Primrose, Has Society Become Tolerant of Further 
Infringement on First Amendment Rights?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 313, 317–20 (2013); 
Heather Greenfield, International Law, Religious Limitations, and Cultural 
Sensitivity: The Park51 Mosque at Ground Zero, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1317, 
1319–22 (2011); Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, 
and the First Amendment, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 353–55 (2011). 
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population appears in the form of legal initiatives prohibiting the use of 
Sharia law in the United States.242 
How can we rationalize policies that target a very specific group of 
people?  Particularly, how can we rationalize those policies that target 
adherents of an unpopular religion, or those who come from regions 
associated with such religions?  How can we understand the Supreme 
Court’s majority decision to uphold a policy obviously condoning 
hatred and animus toward one group of people?  Oklahoma’s urgent 
plea to save their State from Islamic law243 suggests President Trump’s 
exclusionary politics are not accidental.  Rather, these policies share the 
same historical background of exclusion and are rooted in a narrative 
of fear—fear of the non-white stranger in general and fear of the 
Muslim in particular.  Fear has proven to be a useful breeding ground 
for policies of exclusion and reprisal in the United States.244  Part II of 
this article discusses Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment and 
determines that, like the President’s travel ban project, Oklahoma’s 
amendment emanates from feelings of fear and animus toward the 
stranger.245  This analysis will be used in Part III to uncover some of 
the possible myths driving policymakers to design such exclusionary 
policies. 
                                                          
242. See generally Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First Amendment 
Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2012). 
243. Cf. Ross Johnson, A Monolithic Threat: The Anti-Sharia Movement and 
America’s Counter-Subversive Tradition, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 
183, 191 (2012) (describing how the American anti-Sharia movement presents the 
fight against Sharia law in the United States as an “existential conflict”). 
244. See Beydoun, supra note 238, at 114. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 
44.  
245. John M. Bickers, False Facts and Holy War: How the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause Cases Fuel Religious Conflict, 51 IND. L. REV. 305, 332 (2018); 
Hilal Elver, Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to 
Islamophobia, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 162 (2012) (both pointing 
to the role fear plays in pushing anti-Sharia initiatives forward).  
51
Wahedi: Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration Politics of the United S
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
Wahedi camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 1/30/2020  10:25 AM 
186 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
A. State Question 755 
In November 2010, Oklahoma residents participated in a ballot 
initiative aimed to single out Sharia law for a special ban.246  This 
proposal, colloquially titled the Save Our State Amendment, asked 
Oklahomans via State Question 755 whether they agreed with a ban on 
the use of international law and Sharia law in Oklahoma courts.247  The 
proposal defined Sharia law as “Islamic law . . . based on two principal 
sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”248  More than 70% 
of voters agreed with the ban.249 
Rex Duncan, a primary proponent of this initiative, defended this 
amendment as an absolute necessity in the “war for the survival of 
America.”250  Duncan stated that, contrary to Muslims: 
Oklahomans recognize that America was founded on Judeo-
Christian principles . . . [a]nd State Question 755, the Save Our State 
Amendment, is just a simple effort to ensure that our Courts are not 
used to undermine those founding principles and turn Oklahoma into 
something that our founding fathers and our great-grandparents 
wouldn’t recognize.251 
                                                          
246. Sarah Topy, Sharia Law in the Sooner State and Beyond: How the First 
Amendment Impacts the Future of Anti-Sharia Law Statutes, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 
641 (2011). 
247. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1(B) & 1(C) (Okla. 2010) 
(transcript available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf) (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2019).  
248. Id. 
249. Penny M. Venetis, The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma’s SQ 755 and 
Other Provisions like It that Bar State Courts from Considering International Law, 
59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 190 (2011) (the proposal aimed to amend Oklahoma’s 
Constitution in a way that prohibited courts from making use of international law, 
Sharia law, or “the precepts of other nations or cultures”). 
250. NUSSBAUM, supra note 44, at 11; Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 242, at 368. 
See also Justin R. Long, State Constitutions as Interactive Expressions of 
Fundamental Values, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1739, 1744–45 (2010) (discussing how the ban 
was defended by proponents in the public discourse). 
251. Lee Tankle, The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is Fear Itself: Islamophobia 
and the Recently Proposed Unconstitutional and Unnecessary Anti-Religion Laws, 21 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 273, 284 (2012) (quoting Rex Duncan in defense of the 
anti-Sharia proposal); see also Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz, The New Facially Neutral 
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This fallaciously gallant rhetoric unveiled the true motivation 
behind State Question 755: fear of the stranger, in this case Muslims.  
But this animus toward Muslims and their customs had deeper roots, 
grounded in majoritarian sensitivities about who Oklahomans were and 
where their sentiments were coming from.  Specifically, this animus 
stemmed from the idea that the Judeo-Christian character of Oklahoma 
needed protection from a serious threat coming from outside the state 
and even outside the country—those individuals who did not share the 
majoritarian narrative about who Oklahomans are.  In other words, 
Oklahoma was clearly being threatened by Muslims and their 
customs,252 and something had to be done.253 
Apparently, for individuals like Rex Duncan: 
[when] it comes to Christian religious values, their potential 
inconsistency with democracy, equality, and tolerance is never in 
doubt, revealing sharply the degree to which [their] line of 
[reasoning] rests not on a thoroughgoing rationalist secularism but 
on a political theology of Christian democracy in which the identity 
of democratic values with an imagined Christian civilizational 
tradition is unquestioned.254 
                                                          
Anti-Shariah Bills: A Constitutional Analysis, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. 
JUST. 25, 31 (2013). 
252. Carlo A. Pedrioli, Constructing the Other: U.S. Muslims, Anti-Sharia Law, 
and the Constitutional Consequences of Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric, 22 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 65, 69–72 (2012) (analyzing why those who are outside the immigrant 
group fear immigrants and their rituals). 
253. See Ali, supra note 37, at 1065–66. 
254. Nehal Bhuta, Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court 
of Human Rights, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 9, 26 (2014) (admittedly, the quote is a critique 
on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights related to the assessment 
of laws targeting Muslims. However, this quote covers precisely what is so 
problematic about the Oklahoma case and its progeny). For criticism of the United 
States that fits the critical analysis of Nehal Bhuta, see Mark C. Rahdert, 
Exceptionalism Unbound: Appraising American Resistance to Foreign Law, 65 
CATH. U. L. REV. 537, 558 (2016) (arguing that singling out Sharia law for a special 
ban at least implies that the Judeo-Christian legal tradition is not entitled to the same 
amount of disfavor); Robert L. McFarland, Are Religious Arbitration Panels 
Incompatible with Law? Examining “Overlapping Jurisdictions” in Private Law, 4 
FAULKNER L. REV. 367, 371 (2013) (addressing the hypocrisy of those who defend 
religious arbitration but keep Muslims from the same privilege). Cf. Najmeh 
Mahmoudjafari, Religion and Family Law: The Possibility of Pluralistic Cooperation, 
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B. Disfavoring Muslims 
The approval of State Question 755 by Oklahoma voters was 
immediately challenged by Muneer Awad, the executive director of 
Oklahoma’s chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations.255  
On November 9, 2010, the district court granted Awad a preliminary 
injunction, enjoining the Oklahoma State Board of Elections from 
certifying the election outcomes.256  The court found Awad had 
successfully demonstrated the criteria needed to grant the preliminary 
injunction.  Specifically, Awad had demonstrated a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claims and 
that he would suffer from irreparable harm if his request for an 
injunction was denied.257  Furthermore, the balance of hardship and 
public interests advocated for the issuance of an injunction in this 
case.258 
The district court was especially concerned about the consequences 
of the special disfavor to Sharia law. The court found: 
[Awad] has sufficiently set forth a personal stake in this action by 
alleging that he lives in Oklahoma, is a Muslim, that the amendment 
conveys an official government message of disapproval and hostility 
toward his religious beliefs, that sends a clear message he is an 
outsider, not a full member of the political community, thereby 
chilling his access to the government and forcing him to curtail his 
political and religious activities.259 
                                                          
82 UMKC L. REV. 1077, 1085 (2014) (wondering whether similar exceptions made 
for the Jewish community relating to religious arbitration could also be made for 
Muslims).  
255. John T. Parry, Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment: Two Issues for the 
Appeal, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 161, 161 (2012). 
256. Venetis, supra note 249, at 198 (providing an overview and timeline of the 
proceedings).  
257. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 
F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
258. Id. at 1308 (holding that “[while] the public has an interest in the will of 
the voters being carried out, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the 
public has a more profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s 
constitutional rights.”). 
259. Id. at 1303. 
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Similarly, the district court disavowed the argument that Oklahoma’s 
amendment concerned a permissible choice of law.260  In finding the 
amendment explicitly singled out Sharia Law for disfavor, the court 
said: 
[the] amendment creates two independent restrictions on use/
consideration of Sharia Law: (1) the amendment requires that 
Oklahoma courts “shall not consider . . . Sharia Law”, and (2) the 
amendment allows Oklahoma courts to use/consider the law of 
another state of the United States but only if “the other state does not 
include Sharia Law.’’ No other ‘‘legal precepts of other nations or 
cultures” is similarly restricted with respect to the law of another 
state.261 
More fundamentally, the court agreed with Awad’s argument that 
Sharia is not only a legal system, but a way of life “that [provides] 
guidance to [Awad] and other Muslims regarding the exercise of their 
faith.”262 
The Attorney General of Oklahoma appealed the preliminary 
injunction,263 but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision in January 2012.264  On appeal, members of 
the Oklahoma State Board of Elections argued that Awad had not 
suffered actual harm because the adopted amendment was not yet in 
effect when he initiated his lawsuit.  Neither had the rule limiting the 
use of Sharia law been implemented in any Oklahoma court.  Therefore, 
appellants contended, Awad’s action rested merely on hypothetical 
risks.265  The appellate court rejected this line of reasoning, finding the 
                                                          
260. Cf. Kimberly Karseboom, Sharia Law and America: The Constitutionality 
of Prohibiting the Consideration of Sharia Law in American Courts, 10 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 663, 675 (2012) (defending the line that “[if] Sharia is a legal system, 
then the Oklahoma voters had every right to ban its consideration in state courts. It is 
conceivable that the legislators included the portion about Sharia Law in the Save Our 
State Amendment because, as a legal system, it is not covered under the doctrine of 
the Establishment Clause and its subsequent cases. In any event, Oklahoma voters had 
the right to decide which types of law could be considered in their state courts.”). 
261. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
262. Id. 
263. Venetis, supra note 249, at 199. 
264. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1133 (10th Cir. 2012). 
265. Id. at 1120. 
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fear of exclusion and “disfavored treatment” that had driven Awad to 
file the suit was not based on speculation.266  The ban would have been 
enacted a week after the voters’ approval.  The court concluded the 
injunction was warranted, finding the four prongs of the injunction 
test—a successful claim, the balance of harms, irreparable injury, and 
public interests—weighed in Awad’s favor.267 
In discussing the alleged violation of the Establishment Clause, the 
appellate court drew on the Larson test,268 due to the obviously 
discriminatory nature of the Save Our State Amendment.  In this 
respect, the court noted: 
[the] amendment bans only one form of religious law—Sharia law. 
Even if we accept Appellants’ argument that we should interpret 
“cultures” to include “religions,” the text does not ban all religious 
laws. The word “other” in the amendment modifies both “nations” 
and “cultures.” Therefore, if we substituted the word “religions” for 
“cultures,” the amendment would prohibit Oklahoma courts from 
“look[ing] to the legal precepts of other . . . religions.” The word 
“other” implies that whatever religions the legislature considered to 
be part of domestic or Oklahoma culture would not have their legal 
precepts prohibited from consideration, while all others would. Thus, 
the second portion of the amendment that mentions Sharia law also 
discriminates among religions. 269 
The Tenth Circuit’s discussion of the existence of any concrete 
justification for the ban on Sharia law is meaningful not only for the 
greater legal debate concerning the presence or absence of a compelling 
state interest to pursue the ban, but also for its analysis of the real 
reasons behind the ban.270  This analysis again revealed strong feelings 
of animus toward Muslims and their customs.  Consequently, the 
appellate court refrained from a thorough discussion of the existence of 
                                                          
266. Id. at 1123. 
267. Id. at 1126. 
268. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
269. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129.  
270. Id. at 1130 (finding the authorities have “admitted . . . that they did not 
know of even a single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law or 
used the legal precepts of other nations or cultures, let alone that such applications or 
uses had resulted in concrete problems in Oklahoma.”).  
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“a close fit with a compelling state interest.”271  The court’s discussion 
of irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction was also remarkably 
brief, merely approving the district court’s holding.272 
In relation to the balance of harms prong, the court first disavowed 
the argument that Oklahomans should have the right to see authorities 
take their vote seriously.273  The court explicitly rejected this idea, 
reasoning that the balance of harms test prevents authorities from 
enacting laws that seriously infringe upon the constitutional rights of 
part of the population.274  Similarly, the court found that avoiding 
violation of citizens’ fundamental rights is always in the public interest, 
and therefore affirmed the district court’s application of this prong of 
the injunction test.275 
Finally, in the summer of 2013, the District Court for the Western 
District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff, permanently enjoining the authorities from implementing 
State Question 755.276  Although Awad v. Ziriax halted Oklahoma’s 
Save Our State Amendment, such initiatives, largely defended as 
necessary to combat a “barbaric” culture,277 continue to appear.278  
However, as was the case with President Trump’s travel bans, the 
presentation of these initiatives has changed: from explicitly anti-Sharia 
to “facially neutral.”279 
                                                          
271. Id. (holding that a further inquiry is useless because the strict scrutiny test 
requires the presence of both a particular compelling interest and a close fit). 
272. Id. at 1131. 
273. Id. at 1132. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. (holding that “when the law that voters wish to enact is likely 
unconstitutional, their interests do not outweigh Mr. Awad’s in having his 
constitutional rights protected.”). 
276. Chaudhry-Kravitz, supra note 251, at 32 (providing a brief timeline of the 
legal proceedings in Awad v. Ziriax). 
277. See Jeremy Grunert, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Sharia? Award v. 
Ziriax and the Question of Sharia Law in America, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 695, 696 (2013). 
278. Holly Tao, Congress, Courts, and Control over Persuasive Sources of 
Law, 51 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 238 (2015) (examining the rise of anti-Sharia legal 
initiatives in the United States). 
279. Chaudhry-Kravitz, supra note 251, at 26–28 (explaining that after the 
failure to realize an anti-Sharia bill in Oklahoma, the anti-Sharia movement has 
decided to rethink its strategy and moved toward facially neutral measures that could 
have the same effect as the Save our State Amendment). 
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C. Facially Neutral, But Obviously Sectarian 
Recall the history of President Trump’s travel bans: the President-
elect asked his advisory team how he could realize his promised Muslim 
travel ban in a legally-sound way.280  The advisory team concluded the 
threat of “danger” was an appropriate justification for banning 
individuals from Muslim majority countries: the same category of 
people the President had promised to single out for special travel 
restrictions.281  This shift to focusing on national security instead of 
religion was “perfectly sensible, perfectly legal.”282  But, as Justice 
Sotomayor noted in Trump v. Hawaii, this use of neutral language does 
little “to cleanse” such initiatives from their discriminatory purpose and 
obvious animus toward specific groups.283  Contrary to Justice 
Sotomayor, the majority appeared to show sensitivity toward this shift, 
concluding that “because there is persuasive evidence that the entry 
suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns, 
quite apart from any religious hostility, we must accept that 
independent justification.”284 
Apart from this adoption of more facially neutral language, there is 
something else of theoretical relevance about the rise of these legal 
initiatives that may explain the prevalence of animosity toward the 
other.  This may also help us conceptualize policies, like the travel bans, 
that show obvious disdain toward individuals from Muslim majority 
countries.  Put differently, there exists a much deeper ideological root 
                                                          
280. W. Bradley Wendel, Sally Yates, Ronald Dworkin, and the Best View of 
the Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 78, 82 (2016) (using President Trump’s travel 
ban as an example to answer the question “what happens when there are competing 
accounts of what the law permits or requires?”). 
281. Bennett L. Gershman, Rudolph Giuliani and the Ethics of Bullshit, 57 DUQ. 
L. REV. 293, 303 (2019) (quoting Rudy Giuliani). 
282. Jim Dwyer, First Came Giuliani’s Input on the Immigration Order. Now 
There’s the Court Test, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/nyregion/rudolph-giuliani-donald-trump-
travel-ban.html. See also Ana Pottratz Acosta, Sunlight Is the Best Disinfectant: The 
Role of the Media in Shaping Immigration Policy, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 
803, 841–42 (2018) (explaining how this specific statement has played a major role 
in the litigations against the travel bans, saying that challengers have utilized 
statements made in the media to find support for their Establishment Clause claim). 
283. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
284. Id. at 2421. 
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behind the contemporary animosity toward the non-white other: 
misgivings about multiculturalism make a rejection of the Islamic 
culture possible, specifically in the area of alternative dispute resolution 
dealing with disputes that have a religious dimension.285 
Although criticism on religious arbitration as a form of alternative 
dispute resolution might sound fair because of favoritism toward 
religious people, singling them out for special favor,286 it does not 
justify singling out Muslims for special disfavor, either in the form of 
travel bans or in the enactment of rules depriving them from living in 
accordance with their faith.287  This criticism touches upon the presence 
of double standards that explicitly disfavor some groups.  For example, 
in the case of Oklahoma, the Save Our State Amendment singled out 
explicitly Sharia law for special disfavor but remained silent as to other 
                                                          
285. The lack of appreciation of multiculturalism frustrates the possibility of 
having “competing and independent legal orders,” enabling people to find appropriate 
solutions for their civil law disputes in accordance with their religious convictions. 
See Sukhsimranjit Singh, Religious Arbitration and Its Struggles with American Law 
& Judicial Review, 16 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 360 (2016) (arguing that the debate 
about multiculturalism is at the heart of the debate concerning the permissibility of 
religious arbitration within secular systems); Joel A. Nichols, Religion, Marriage, and 
Pluralism, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 967, 976 (2011) (saying that the “disconnect 
between religious law and civil law, when combined with premises of 
multiculturalism and the deep commitments of religious believers, has led to calls for 
greater legal recognition of the decisions of religious tribunals.”). Cf. Michael A. 
Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating 
Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (2011) (purporting that anti-
Sharia legal initiatives mainly “seek to undermine the ability of groups to serve as 
competing and independent legal orders, thereby striking at the very heart of the new 
multiculturalism.”). 
286. Importantly, this concern can be seen as the other side of our critique so 
far on measures that have singled out groups for a special disfavor qua religion. 
Singling groups out for a special favor qua religion is on similar grounds very 
objectionable. See generally Sohail Wahedi, Abstraction from the Religious 
Dimension, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2017–2018) (discussing the liberal critique 
on singling out religion for a special favor). For a critique of favoritism in relation to 
religious arbitration, see Brian Hutler, Religious Arbitration and the Establishment 
Clause, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 358 (2018). For a discussion on the 
problem with favoritism, see generally Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be 
Exempt from Civil Rights Laws, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 788 (2007) (claiming that 
favoritism toward certain groups undermines the authority of rules).  
287. James A. Sonne, Domestic Applications of Sharia and the Exercise of 
Ordered Liberty, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 717, 728 (2015) (arguing a disfavored 
treatment of Sharia law in courts is not justified). 
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religious legal systems.288  The courts in Awad easily parried the 
concerns and shattered the illusion—created out of myths and persisting 
conspiracy theories about Muslims—that Oklahoma was facing a huge 
Sharia problem.  The Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, however, 
showed sensitivity to the seemingly neutral re-description of the travel 
ban, despite its undeniable and notorious history of hostility toward 
Muslims. 
Comparing the travel ban cases to the Save Our State Amendment 
debacle raises three delicate and challenging questions.  First, how do 
we rationalize the return of exclusionary politics that single out people 
with immigrant backgrounds for disfavored treatment?  Second, how 
can we understand the return of exclusionary politics as such?  And 
third, how can we spread awareness of the devastating effects of such 
discriminatory policies? 
The first question is contextual in nature.  Fear has played a 
significant role in both the enactment of the travel bans and in the rise 
of anti-Sharia initiatives.289  The fear of uncertainty as to who is 
entering the country, namely potential terrorists, led to the issuance of 
the travel ban.  And it was the fear of who is already living here, namely 
people who follow the rules of an evil tradition, that caused the wave of 
anti-Sharia initiatives.  This focus on border protection and preservation 
of the majoritarian narrative led to the rise of fear-based politics not 
                                                          
288. Cf. Rahdert, supra note 254, at 557–58. 
289. Fear plays a major role in cases that, in one way or another, threaten 
majoritarian sensitivities. Cf. Sohail Wahedi, The Health Law Implications of Ritual 
Circumcisions, 22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 209, 211–12 (2019) (discussing the first 
ever criminal trial in the United States regarding the permissibility of the lightest 
version of female circumcision, separation of the mucous membrane from the girls’ 
genitalia, which was rhetorically presented as a horrifying case of brutality. While this 
case concerned religious female circumcision that in all respects was less invasive 
than religious male circumcision, the mass media attention for “genital mutilation” 
made it impossible to say something meaningful about the lawfulness of this variant 
of female circumcision); Saul Levmore, Can Wrinkles be Glamorous?, in SAUL 
LEVMORE & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, AGING THOUGHTFULLY: CONVERSATIONS 
ABOUT RETIREMENT, ROMANCE, WRINKLES, AND REGRET 104 (2017) (“[T]he fact that 
so many thoughtful people find female but not male circumcision abhorrent, suggests 
that a critical difference is that one is practiced on a group that is, at least to Western 
eyes, seriously constrained and subjugated by a variety of practices.”).  
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grounded in a thorough and rationalist approach to the problems they 
claim to solve.290 
The second question about how we should understand the return of 
these exclusionary politics is a conceptual one.  How did it come to be 
that in both cases, the religious dimension was pushed to the margins?  
The travel bans were presented—ultimately with great success—as 
solutions to growing national security concerns.  The Save Our State 
Amendment, finding significantly less success, was presented merely 
as a choice-of-law or choice-of-forum issue.  This sharp abstraction 
from the religious dimension,291 particularly to the field of national 
security, has made it possible to marginalize serious criticism of the 
travel restrictions.  After all, who could be against national security 
measures?292 
The third question is about recommendations, focusing primarily 
on how to overcome the era of fear and spread awareness of the 
devastating effects of policies that single out minority groups for 
disfavored treatment.  But before we can address solutions to the 
challenges posed by these fear-based politics, we must first identify and 
define what is at risk. 
III. FREE OUR POLITICS FROM ANIMUS 
Following our analysis of fear-driven politics, we are left with two 
fundamental questions.  First, how can we conceptualize such politics?  
More specifically: against which theoretical backdrop can we 
conceptualize politics that single out specific groups—in our case, 
American Muslims—for special disfavored treatment?  And second, 
how can we save our politics from fear and animus in an era of terror, 
anxiety, and social unrest? 
What is interesting about the travel ban project and the Save Our 
State debacle is that we can identify some facially neutral justification 
in both cases.  While both situations could easily be characterized as 
concerning animus toward Muslims, there is another approach: 
                                                          
290. Cf. Bhuta, supra note 254. 
291. Cf. Wahedi, supra note 286, at 37. 
292. See, e.g., Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 
70 VAND. L. REV. 777, 838 (2017) (discussing President Trump’s style of leadership 
and suggesting that “today’s conditions of partisanship and polarization significantly 
reduce the possibility of meaningful oversight . . . ”). 
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abstraction from the religious dimension.  This is reflected in the Trump 
administration’s decision to translate the President’s promise to shut 
down the borders to Muslims.  The administration found a suitable and 
legally acceptable way to keep that promise, shifting the attention from 
religion and instead focusing on national security.  This strategy 
corresponded with concerns intelligence services generally have about 
people coming from conflict areas, such as the Middle East and other 
Muslim-majority countries.  A similar strategy was adopted in the 
Sharia ban cases: shifting the attention from religion to choice-of-law 
and choice-of-forum issues. 
Both security concerns and choice-of-law issues were facially 
neutral and, therefore, suitable substitutes for the categories they 
effectively targeted.  But what does abstraction from the religious 
dimension entail and how does it work in relation to the fear-driven 
politics discussed in this article?  To answer this question, we must first 
acknowledge that the idea of abstraction, as discussed here, derives 
from the scholarly debate about the relationship between law and 
religion within the paradigm of liberal political philosophy.293  
Basically, liberal theories of religious freedom dealing with the 
specialness of religion for either religious accommodation or 
justification of public decisions294 have one major commonality: 
abstraction from the religious dimension.295 
Liberal theories of religious freedom are skeptical about the 
specialness of religion, rejecting the special legal solicitude toward 
religion.296  In other words, there should be no room for sectarian 
                                                          
293. For a discussion of the debate surrounding the place of religion in liberal 
political philosophy, see generally CÉCILE LABORDE & AURÉLIA BARDON, RELIGION 
IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2017). 
294. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1351, 1357 (2012). 
295. Wahedi, supra note 286, at 37.   
296. Cf. Kenneth Einar Himma, An Unjust Dogma: Why a Special Right to 
Religion Wrongly Discriminates Against Non-Religious Worldviews, 54 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 217, 219 (2017). See generally BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 
(2014); RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & 
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007) (all 
agreeing that sectarian arguments in favor of religious freedom are insufficient to 
justify singling out religion for special legal solicitude). 
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justifications of the special legal solicitude toward religion.297  Within 
this approach, religion can only be considered special and, thus, a 
protection-worthy category via abstraction.  That is to say, via the 
identification of its liberal and neutral substitutes.298  The question 
becomes whether politics of fear, as described in this article, are 
paradigmatic expressions of abstraction.  Intuitively, the answer is yes.  
Because of the strong rejectionist nature of the abstraction thesis that 
aims to find liberal substitutes for religion, explaining based hereon, 
why it is for example worthy to protect some religious practices, such 
as wearing headscarves or consuming Halal and Kosher food.  
Ultimately, not because these cases concern matters of religion, but 
because they concern matters of conscience.299 
This rejection of the religious dimension that defines the 
abstraction strategy makes sense when analyzing the Government’s 
decision to present the travel ban as purely a security matter.  This also 
helps explain why authorities in Oklahoma strongly emphasized 
approaching State Question 755 solely as a choice-of-law matter.  In 
both cases, abstraction was a useful strategy to shift the conversation 
away from religion and its serious constitutional concerns. 
Although it may be true that abstraction from the religious 
dimension, as presented here, could be used to declare every unpopular 
religious act out of order,300 abstraction also emphasizes the importance 
of egalitarianism.  In this context, that means authorities should enable 
all citizens to make use of their basic liberties to the same extent.  
Conversely, authorities should not favor one group at the expense of 
another.  Thus, because of its emphasis on egalitarianism, abstraction 
                                                          
297. For a sectarian defense of religious freedom, see Michael W. McConnell, 
Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 786–89 (2013); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 
1183 (2013).  
298. See, e.g., JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND 
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 89 (2011) (considering freedom of conscience an 
appropriate substitute for freedom of religion). 
299. Cf. LEITER, supra note 296, at 64; MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 298, at 
77. 
300. Sohail Wahedi, Freedom of Religion and Living Together, 49 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 213 (2018–2019) (explaining European cases of singling out Muslims for 
special restrictions in light of abstraction from the religious dimension). 
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disapproves a favored treatment of religion.  But it also disapproves—
for reasons of neutrality—a disfavored treatment of religion.301 
Neither the travel ban nor the Save Our State Amendment can pass 
the second prong of abstraction: the ban on singling out groups of 
people or beliefs for special restrictions.  Animosity toward Muslims 
was obviously present in both cases.  The travel ban claims to deal with 
security measures, keeping potential terrorists, rapists, honor killers, 
and other troublemakers outside the United States.  The Save Our State 
Amendment similarly hid the religious concerns of its Muslim victims 
by positing that it aims solely to see that Oklahoma courts utilize only 
American laws, rather than any foreign laws. 
The question now becomes how to overcome this era of anxiety 
toward the other.  Anti-Sharia legal initiatives did not stop after Awad.  
In fact, there has been an increase in the amount of such initiatives 
proposed throughout the country.  Additionally, the Islamic faith has 
been singled out for special restrictions in the areas of labor and land 
allocation for religious institutes. 
Obviously, politics of fear are contrary to the promise of the 
American Dream.  The only legacies these fear-driven politics will 
leave will be the creation of disparities between groups of people, 
downgrading them to secondary citizens;302 the reinforcement of 
majoritarianism and the political advancement of a clearly xenophobic 
immigration agenda;303 and, above all, the institutionalization of 
Islamophobia.304 
But we should not give up quickly.  We may still have some hope 
to overcome this era of anxiety, animus, and disregard of the 
constitutional traditions of freedom and neutrality.  Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion regarding public manners in Trump v. Hawaii 
provides some guidance here.  A broad interpretation of Justice 
Kennedy’s forceful plea reminds the authorities to be mindful of what 
the constitutional tradition tells them; to bear in mind the freedoms 
                                                          
301. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 296, at 130 (defending the line that liberal 
democracies should not abandon a particular lifestyle because another lifestyle is 
“intrinsically better.” It should be left to citizens to decide which way of life better 
suits them).  
302. Ali, supra note 37, at 1031. 
303. Kapur, supra note 176, at 307. 
304. See generally Beydoun, supra note 36. 
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guaranteed in the Constitution; and to be aware of legal constraints, 
such as the Establishment Clause.305 
Indeed, we should not forget this country is “built upon the promise 
of religious liberty. [The Founding Fathers] honored that core promise 
by embedding the principle of religious neutrality in the First 
Amendment.”306  Similarly, we should keep in mind what Dr. King 
fought to achieve: more equality and less disparity.  Pursuing the ideal 
of equal liberty and equal respect for human beings in a highly divided 
world is the least we can do to honor Dr. King’s powerful and timeless 
dream. 
Just as important as the plea for equal liberty, public manners, and 
respect for the constitutional tradition, is the need for having and 
maintaining “a Judiciary willing to hold the [political] branches 
[accountable] when they defy our most sacred legal commitments,” 
such as religious freedom.307 
CONCLUSION 
Immigration has always been subject to great political debate in the 
United States.  Today, however, the explicit use of anti-immigration 
rhetoric has become common among a significant portion of the 
political establishment.  This rhetoric has provoked the immigration 
debate and shaped the contours of the contemporary political discourse 
concerning immigration.  With the 2016 election of President Trump 
came a tougher attitude toward immigration and immigrants.  
Subsequently, the 2018 midterm elections revealed an increase in 
“Islamophobic” rhetoric among political campaigners.  This stricter 
attitude toward immigration has manifested itself in two ways.  First, 
through the aggressive language used to discuss immigration.  And 
second, through the proliferation of restrictions aiming to inhibit 
immigrants from entering the United States. 
What is striking about both political developments is the undue use 
of stereotypes.  These stereotypes have intensified concerns about 
undocumented immigrants, illegal border crossings, and national 
security threats.  Specifically, this latter concern has been used to justify 
                                                          
305. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
306. Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
307. Id. at 2448.   
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the special need for radical measures in the fight against immigration—
measures ranging from building a separation wall between the United 
States and Mexico to denying citizens of some countries access into the 
United States.  As a consequence of this harsh political reality, people 
with immigrant backgrounds suffer from harassment, hatred, and racial 
profiling. 
This article has focused on the challenges faced by one group in 
particular: the Muslim community.  The contemporary anti-
immigration atmosphere draws upon fears of uncertainty about who is 
crossing the borders and who is living here.  To deal with these 
concerns, authorities have singled out Muslims and their faith for 
special restrictions.  This is obviously discriminatory and contrary to 
the rich constitutional tradition of freedom and neutrality. 
To halt a further racialization of Muslims and to overcome the 
contemporary era of fear, anxiety, and distrust, we must act in 
accordance with and uphold the constitutional tradition of freedom and 
neutrality.  We must foster a strong judiciary that can halt the executive 
and legislative branches if necessary.  We must keep in mind: no more 
racial discrimination, but equal liberty and equal respect toward the 
other, even if the other does not share our beliefs or our way of life. 
EPILOGUE 
The travel ban project and the Save Our State debacle fit a broader 
tendency of disregarding constitutional traditions of religious liberty 
and state neutrality toward religion, applying double standards and 
framing the “other” as dangerous, unwelcome, and unfit.  
Unfortunately, this tendency is present across many liberal 
democracies: from the Far East, to the Middle East, Europe, and North 
America.  Of these places, the situation in Europe is comparable to, and 
in some instances even worse, than what we see happening in the United 
States.  The rise in measures targeting people with an Islamic 
background is perplexing.  And the restraint of the judiciary to defend 
“our most sacred legal commitments” is regrettable.308 
As such, the religious freedom jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights is notoriously Islamophobic in nature, likely resting 
                                                          
308. Id. 
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on myths about Muslims,309 rather than drawing on an approach 
attesting to equal respect and equal liberty.310  It has proven to be very 
“lenient toward practices of Christian establishment and overtly 
intolerant toward the presence of Islam.”311  But more alarming is the 
rise of concrete measures across European states singling out the 
Islamic faith for special bans.  For example, in 2015, Austria adopted 
the “Islam-bill,” singling out Islamic organizations and banning them 
from receiving foreign funding.312  More recently, the European 
Parliament has proposed to close all Islamic centers, including mosques 
and other institutes that operate contrary to values of the European 
Union, while again leaving other religions unmentioned.313 
Abstraction may be a helpful strategy to separate practices from 
their religious dimension, but it is never a justificatory strategy for 
discrimination, religious intolerance, or the spread of hatred toward 
unpopular religious groups. 
 
 
                                                          
309. Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and 
the Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 275 (2008) 
(saying with reference to critics of the case law of this Court that “there appears to be 
a bias in the jurisprudence of the [European Court of Human Rights] under article 9 
toward protecting traditional and established religions and a corresponding 
insensitivity toward the rights of minority, nontraditional, or unpopular religious 
groups.”). See also Samuel Moyn, Religious Freedom and the Fate of Secularism, in 
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 27 (Jean Louise Cohen 
& Cécile Laborde Eds., 2016) (asking rhetorically with respect to the systematically 
different legal treatment of Islamic cases before the ECtHR: “Do the cases . . . reflect 
a Christian Islamophobia in the principled garb of secularism?”). 
310. Christian Joppke, Pluralism vs. Pluralism: Islam and Christianity in the 
European Court of Human Rights, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 88 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile Laborde Eds., 2016) (analyzing the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights in religious freedom cases and 
claiming the Court interprets pluralism as a value that is threatened by the Islamic 
faith and therefore needs protection).   
311. CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 33 (2017). 
312. See Elahe Izadi, Austria Is Taking Controversial Steps to Tighten a 100-
Year-Old ‘Law on Islam’, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/02/26/austria-is-
taking-controversial-steps-to-tighten-a-100-year-old-law-on-islam/. 
313. Wahedi, supra note 300, at 228. 
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